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William H. Charles* Inherent Jurisdiction and its Application by
Nova Scotia Courts: Metaphysical,
Historical or Pragmatic?
The author explores the concept of inherent jurisdiction in the context of its use
and application by the courts of Nova Scotia. A general in-depth discussion of the
nature and source(s) of the concept is followed by an examination of three recent
Court of Appeal decisions in an effort to determine that court's understanding
of inherent jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal's understanding and sense of the
concept is then contrasted with its use and application by the trial courts of Nova
Scotia over a period of 150 years. The approach of the two levels of court to
inherent jurisdiction is compared and the limits of the concept examined. A review
of the use of inherent jurisdiction by Nova Scotia courts in arbitration matters
is undertaken to show the common law as a source of the concept of inherent
jurisdiction, at least in this one area of law The inherent jurisdiction of inferior
courts, such as the Small Claims Court and others is discussed, as is the inherent
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal.
L'auteur examine le concept de <competence inhdrente., ou <<compdtence
propre. dans le contexte de son utilisation et de son application par les tribunaux
de la Nouvelle-Ecosse. Une discussion en profondeur de la nature et des sources
du concept est suivie d'un examen de trois d~cisions rdcentes de la Cour d'appel
afin de d6terminer la comprdhension qu'a la Cour de la compdtence inhdrente.
La compr6hension de la Cour d'appel et son interprdtation du concept sont
ensuite compardes 6 son utilisation et 6 son application par les tribunaux de
premiere instance de la Nouvelle-8cosse sur une p6riode de 150 anndes. Les
fagons respectives de chaque tribunal d'aborder la compdtence inhdrente sont
compardes, et les limites du concept sont examindes. Un examen de lutilisation
de la competence inh6rente par les tribunaux de la Nouvelle-8cosse en matibre
d'arbitrage montre que la common law est 6 'origine du concept de comp6tence
inh6rente, au moins dans ce domaine du droit. La competence inhdrente des
tribunaux infdrieurs, par exemple belle de la Cour des petites crdances, est
discutde tout comme la compdtence inhdrente de la Cour d'appel.
* William H. Charles, QC, former Dean and Professor Emeritus, Schulich School of Law at
Dalhousie University. This paper is an elaboration and extension ofan original report commissioned in
2005 by the Nova Scotia Law Reform Commission as part of the background research for the revision
of the Civil Procedure Rules of Nova Scotia. The original paper was circulated to the judiciary but not
the members of the Bar. I am indebted to the Nova Scotia Law Reform Commission for permission
to use the original report as the starting point for this endeavour.
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Literally speaking, the phrase "inherent jurisdiction" means a power
or authority possessed by a person or institution that is not derived or
supplied from an outside source.' "Inherent jurisdiction" is, then, a self-
generating intrinsic source of power. The terms "jurisdiction" and "power"
are frequently used together or interchangeably. It might be, perhaps, more
accurate to think of the term "jurisdiction" as the source of powers but this
distinction is not often made.
This paper attempts to determine how, and to what extent, Nova Scotia
courts at all levels have relied on their so-called "inherent jurisdiction."
An exploration of its use and application should provide a clearer sense
of understanding of the concept and the circumstances in which it will
be used. For example, is inherent jurisdiction some sort of metaphysical
1. Black ' Law Dictionary, 6th ed, sub verbo "inherent jurisdiction."
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primordial power or immanent attribute with which Superior Courts are
endowed and which is essential to their task, or is inherent jurisdiction
something else?
The paper consists of seven sections. In Part I the historical evolution
of inherent jurisdiction is presented as well as the explanations and
analysis of the concept by a number of legal commentators. The material
should provide the reader with a glimpse of the many faces of inherent
jurisdiction.
In Part II the approach to and understanding of inherent jurisdiction by
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal as reflected in a trilogy of cases decided
during a nine year period covering 2000 to 2009 is canvassed.
Part III discusses an extensive survey and analysis of Nova Scotia trial
court decisions on inherent jurisdiction covering the period 1853 to 2009.
The survey was undertaken to obtain a better understanding of the approach
of trial courts in Nova Scotia to the question of inherent jurisdiction. The
results of this survey are examined more fully in Appendix A.
Part IV of the paper explores the limits of inherent jurisdiction in the
context of three suggested factors; namely, procedure; statutes; and rules
of court.
Because arbitration cases were revealed by the survey discussed
in Part III to comprise one of the more numerically significant group
of cases, wherein inherent jurisdiction was invoked by the trial courts,
Part V examines them in some detail, with a view to determining the
source of inherent jurisdiction in this particular area of the law.
Finally, the question of the specific inherent jurisdiction of "inferior
courts" in Nova Scotia is examined in Part VI and that of the inherent
jurisdiction of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Part VII.
I. The concept of inherent jurisdiction
The concept or doctrine has been the subject of discussion by only a handful
of legal commentators. 2 Those who have discussed the concept all agree
about the uncertainty that surrounds the idea of "inherent jurisdiction,"
both with regard to its source and the scope of its application. As one
English commentator has lamented, "[i]t is a difficult idea to pin down.
There is no agreement on what it is, where it came from, which courts and
2. See IH Jacob, "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court" (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23;
Keith Mason, "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court" (1983) 57 Australian Li 449; Martin Dockray,
"The Inherent Jurisdiction to Regulate Civil Proceedings" (1997) 113 Law Q Rev 120; Keith
Yamauchi, "The Courts' Inherent Jurisdiction and the CCAA: A Beneficent or Bad Doctrine?" (2004)
40 Canadian Business U 250; and Jerold Taitz, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Cape
Town: Juta & Co Ltd, 1985).
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tribunals have it and what it can be used for."' In the same vein, and in the
words of the most-quoted English commentator, Master Jacob has stated:
The inherent jurisdiction of the court may be invoked in an apparently
inexhaustible variety of circumstances and may be exercised in different
ways. This peculiar concept is indeed so amorphous and ubiquitous
and so pervasive in its operation that it seems to defy the challenge to
determine its quality and to establish its limits. 4
In spite of this uncertainty, Jacob still considers this concept as the "very
life-blood" of a superior court, and its "immanent attribute."'
This "peculiar concept" has been described by another legal scholar as
"[a]n almost primordial power with which [Supreme Courts are] endowed
to give effect to the demands of justice and, at the same time, to maintain
[their] pivotal position as an independent arbiter within the structures of
the modem democratic state."'
With such a mysterious and unruly concept one might have thought that
to attempt a definition would involve a "mission impossible." However,
Master Jacob was equal to the task and offered the following definition
which appears to have been generally accepted with great gratitude by
Canadian and other courts, including the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal:
The inherent jurisdiction of the court may be defined as being the reserve
or fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court may
draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and
in particular to ensure the observance of due process of law, to prevent
improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to
secure a fair trial between them.'
The first question that might be raised by this definition is "residual" to
what? Presumably Master Jacob was referring to the other legal authority
or power conferred on a Superior Court by the common law, statutes, or the
rules of court. When the powers conferred by these sources are inadequate,
the court can turn to this other source of power (inherent jurisdiction) and
do what is "just and equitable" in the circumstances.
Reference to this phase with its judicial discretion and equity
attributes conjures up visions of the chancellor's foot. The other more
specific references to "doing justice between the parties" and securing a
3. Dockray, supra note 2 at 120.
4. Jacob, supra note 2 at 23.
5. Ibid at 27.
6. Marimous Wieslers, "Foreword" in Taitz, supra note 2.
7. Jacob, supra note 2 at 51, as quoted by Saunders JA in Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Ofume,
2003 NSCA 110, 218 NSR (2d) 234.
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fair trial further support the emphasis upon a chancery like discretion and
jurisdiction as a characteristic of inherent jurisdiction. But the definition
also makes reference to controlling the court process by preventing abuse
of that process with sanctions like "contempt" orders to assure control.
Judicial efficiency is, therefore, also an aspect of inherent jurisdiction,
and, historically, a very important one. According to Master Jacob, "it
operates as a valuable weapon in the hands of the court to prevent any
clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice."
Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Honourable
Brian Dickson, has noted that the English doctrine is reflected in most if
not all common law jurisdictions, though not as extensively as the United
States.' The historical evolution of the term "inherent jurisdiction" and
its use by English courts has been documented by Martin S. Dockray
who notes that the term was infrequently used prior to 1875 and then
only in reference to cases involving contempt of court and abuse of court
process.'0 Its use broadened after 1880 and its frequency increased with
the courts using the phrase to justify actions in relation to procedural
matters more generally, the awarding of costs, and control over solicitors.
It was not until 1945 that, apparently, this concept began to be used in
relation to trusts and children."'
It is only relatively recently that the term inherent jurisdiction has
been recognized and discussed by the legal community and the judiciary.
This recognition and interest was sparked by the seminal article by Master
Jacob in 1970 which has been subsequently referred to and relied upon by
courts in England, Canada, and the United States.'
Sources of Inherent Jurisdiction
Various efforts have been made to trace the source of"inherentjurisdiction."
For Master Jacob it is found in the very nature of a court and a superior
court of law. It is inherent jurisdiction that allows the superior court to
fulfill itself as a court." There are other theories however. One suggests
that inherent powers to control procedure are incidents of substantive
procedure rather than features which are part of the character of the court.
They arise not out of the substantive jurisdiction but "at common law as
the legal incidents of that jurisdiction." 4
8. Jacob, supra note 2 at 52.
9. BCGEU v British Columbia (Attorney General), [ 1988] 2 SCR 214, [1988] SCJ no 76.
10. Dockray, supra note 2 at 121.
11. Ibid.
12. Supra note 2.
13. Ibid at 27.
14. Dockray, supra note 2 at 126-27.
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Support for this theory can be found in the decision of the Court of
Queen's Bench, Divisional Court in R. v. Norwich Crown Court." In this
case it was argued that the jurisdiction of the Crown Court was derived from
statutes and that any powers which were inherent in its jurisdiction had to
have their origins in the statute. In an unanimous decision, the Divisional
Court explained that it preferred the theory that inherent powers arise from
common law, independently of the statutes which create the jurisdiction of
the court. To arise at common law, presumably means as declared to exist
by the judiciary rather than parliament.
In an earlier decision in 1964, Lord Morris had declared:
There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular
jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively
within such jurisdiction. I would regard them as powers which are
inherent in its jurisdiction. A court must enjoy such powers in order to
enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process."
As one legal commentator has observed, this approach or theory "avoids
metaphysical debate about the immanent attributes of superior courts and
concentrates attention instead on what is necessary and appropriate if a
particular court is to be able to undertake its work effectively.""
Several judges of the Supreme Court of Canada have expressed the
opinion that the common law is the source of inherent jurisdiction.
However, there are several legal commentators from the Commonwealth
who agree with Jacob that inherent jurisdiction is either "a somewhat
metaphysical concept"" or totally metaphysical.2 0 But, being metaphysical,
it is nevertheless very real.2 1 While generally agreeing upon its nature, these
commentators see the function of inherent jurisdiction quite differently.
Mason, for example, sees inherent jurisdiction as representing "a judicial
power of last resort that will be invoked to block certain types of conduct
which are not regulated by statutes or rules of court or, may be expressly
permitted by them."22 While this suggests a certain defensive function,
the same author suggests that "inherent jurisdiction is also used by some
15. Rv Norwich Crown Court, [1992] 1 WLR 54 (QB).
16. Connelly v Diretor ofPublic Prosecutions, [1964] AC 1254 at 1301 (HL).
17. Dockray, supra note 2 at 127.
18. See e.g. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Canadian Pacic System Federation v
Canadian Pacific Ltd, [1996] 2 SCR 495, [1996] SCJ no 42; and Bastarache J (dissenting) in Vaughan
v Canada, 2005 SCC I f, [2005] 1 SCR 146 at paras 71-72.
19. Mason, supra note 2 at 458.
20. Taitz, supra note 2 at 2.
21. Ibid.
22. Supra note 2 at 458.
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judges to promote higher standards of litigation." 23 Taitz on the other hand
agrees with Dockray that:
The inherent jurisdiction of the Court ...consists of those unwritten
powers possessed by the Court without which it would be unable to act
in the exercise of its judicial function with justice and reasonableness,
and which includes, though not necessarily exclusively, powers to:
(a) regulate its proceedings and prevent an abuse of its process...;
(b) impose sanctions for the impairment of its dignity or for failure to
comply with its lawful order [contempt];
(c) control and supervise its officers...;
(d) restrain irregularities in the proceedings of lower or inferior courts...;
and
(e) restrain irregularities in the proceedings of administrative
[tribunals] .24
All of the above mentioned authors have been referred to and in many
cases quoted with approval by Canadian courts, but the article by Master
Jacob is by far the most often quoted and considered the most influential.25
Because of this, it might be argued that, by implication, Canadian courts
have accepted the more metaphysical explanation as to the source of
"inherent jurisdiction" or powers.
Another explanation for the use of the term "inherent jurisdiction"
by English courts is that it was a way of referring to the old general
jurisdiction that English courts had enjoyed prior to the abolition of those
courts by the Judicature Acts of 1873 to 1875, when a new Supreme
Court was created. 26 At this time, a new set of mandatory court rules of
procedure were developed in the form of a Code of Procedure. The Code,
however, was not exhaustive, and the legislation provided that existing
powers, procedures and forms were to be preserved to the extent that they
were not incompatible with the new provisions. During the 1880s some
English courts held that features of the old general jurisdiction of superior
courts had survived because they were inherent in the notion of what it
was to be a superior court, in contrast to very specific statutory provisions.
This explanation still promotes the idea that inherent jurisdiction is
something intrinsic and flows from the nature of a superior court itself.
23. Mason, supra note 2 at 458.
24. Taitz, supra note 2 at 4-5.
25. Ibid.
26. Dockray, supra note 2 at 122.
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Later references to inherent jurisdiction by English courts in the latter half
of the twentieth century do not see inherent powers as survivors from a
previous time but represent examples of a broad general jurisdiction that
can be used whenever the need arises.27
The extent of this broad jurisdiction can be appreciated when it is
realized that from the somewhat narrow limits of punishing contempt and
controlling abuse of court process the concept of inherent jurisdiction
has been used to justify, among other things, the variation of trusts, the
safeguarding of children, the provision of remedies in situations where the
statutory provisions do not, and to supervise as well as protect and assist
inferior courts and tribunals and the filling of gaps in statutes. This ever-
expanding jurisdiction is bound to create concern among legal observers
that courts may think they have carte blanche. An examination of the
language used by some courts to describe their inherent jurisdiction could
easily give this impression and could evoke memories of the chancellor's
discretion. The House of Lords has rejected such an open-ended approach
and suggested that the concept of inherent jurisdiction be narrowed
considerably. In the words of Lord Diplock:
It would, I think be conducive to legal clarity if the use of these two
expressions [inherent power and inherent jurisdiction] were confined to
the doing by the court of acts which it needs must have power to do in
order to maintain its character as a court of justice.28
This is still pretty general but at least restricts the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction to the litigation process and the administration of justice in a
more procedural sense..
Part of the reason for what appears to be an ever-broadening scope
of the concept of inherent jurisdiction is the tendency of some courts to
fail to realize the difference between inherent jurisdiction and the general
jurisdiction of a superior court as a court of common law and equity; the
exercise of the Crown prerogative vis-A-vis inferior courts and tribunals as
well as parens patriae regarding children; and the maxim "where there is
a right there is a remedy" (ubi ius ibi remedium).
In Nova Scotia, the general jurisdiction of the Nova Scotia Supreme
Court has been traced by MacKeigan C.J. in MidlandDoherty v Roher and
Central Trust Company,2 9 who notes that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
27. Dockray, supra note 2 at 129 referring to The Siskina, [1979] AC 210 at 262 per Lord
Hailsham.
28. Bremer Vulkan v Schiffbau und Maschineenfabrik v South India Shipping Corporation, [1981] 1
AC 909, [1981] 2 WLR 141 (HL).
29. Midland Doherty v Rohrer and Central Trust Company (1985), 70 NSR (2d) 234 (SC (AD)).
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Court of Nova Scotia is that of the Supreme Court as originally established
long before the Judicature Act of 1884. This jurisdiction included the
same powers as were formerly exercised by the English Courts of Queen's
Bench, Common Pleas, or Chancery and Exchequer and with the same
powers as were exercised by the Supreme Court of Judicature in England
as they were on the 19th of April 1884.
The notion of an unlimited jurisdiction in a superior court may have
evolved from the ancient English legal principle that was expressed in
Peacock v. Bell to the effect that "the rule for jurisdiction is that nothing
shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of the superior court but that
which specifically appears to be so."30 In proceedings before a superior court
it was unnecessary to allege that the court was possessed ofjurisdiction-
unlike an inferior court proceeding. It was up to the court itself to decide
judicially whether it was acting within its jurisdiction. This led to the
idea that the jurisdiction of a superior court was unlimited. But, as one
legal commentator has observed, this notion of unlimited jurisdiction is
separate and distinct from the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction, although an
unknowing mixing of the two ideas could lead to the belief that there is no
limit to inherent jurisdiction and could account for its broad application."1
Similarly, the inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over
children and trusts or estates as well as the general notion of the Chancellor
relieving the rigours of the common law, contributed to the use of the
doctrine of inherent jurisdiction by courts in these areas.32 But again, equity
jurisdiction and inherent jurisdiction are not the same thing. However, it
should be noted that in his testimony before the Nova Scotia Supreme Court
in Re Killam Estate," Professor Donovan Waters seemed to point to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the English Chancery Court over charitable
trusts as an example of the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. In the course
of explaining that the present Nova Scotia Supreme Court does have the
power with respect to the administration of charitable trusts, Professor
30. Peacock v Bell (1667), 1 Wms Saund 73; 85 ER 84 at 87-88.
31. Taitz, supra note 2 at 56.
32. For cases where this may have occurred see: Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co, [19911
3 SCR 534, 85 DLR (4th) 129; Deruelle v Children sAid Society of Cape Breton (1978) 86 DLR (3d)
687, 26 NSR (2d) 125 (SC (AD)); Societd des Acadiens v Association of Parents, [1986] 1 SCR 549,
27 DLR (4th) 406; Bast v Bast (1975), 72 DLR (3d) 548, 20 NSR (2d) 604 (SC (TD)); Re Estate of
William P Spencer (1969), 9 DLR (3d) 74, 1 NSR (2d) 282 (SC (TD)) [Re Spencer]; O'Neill v O'Neill
(1971), 4 NSR (2d) 64 (SC); Glasgow v Glasgow (1983), 57 NSR (2d) 355 (SC (AD)); Mintz v Mintz
(1979), 33 NSR (2d) 585 (SC (TD)); Re Murphy, Margaret (1970), 3 NSR (2d) 293 (SC (TD)); Warner
v Warner (1996), 150 NSR (2d) 38 (SC); and Re Killam Estate (1999), 185 NSR (2d) 201 (SC).
33. lbid.
72 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Waters traced the devolution of that authority from the old English Court
of Chancery in these words:
The jurisdiction assumed by the one-time Court of Chancery to sustain
and further charitable trusts was implicitly taken over by the High Court
of England after the fusion by the Judicature Act, 1873, of.the Royal
Courts, and the same assumption (or inherent) jurisdiction passed to
the courts of the colonies overseas. It remained when the colonies of
the Empire became the Dominions of the Commonwealth and, finally,
totally independent nations.34
Inherent jurisdiction, in the form of judicial review of inferior courts
and tribunals, really has its source in the powers the superior courts
have historically had to exercise the Crown's prerogative and to issue
prerogative writs. It does not arise from the special nature of a superior
court. This distinction is recognized by both Jacob" and Taitz 6 but not
by many courts. Even Lord Denning, in the course of commenting upon
the supervisory role of the Court of Kings Bench, referred to the fact that
the court "has an inherent jurisdiction to control all inferior tribunals"" as
part of its supervisory role. In some instances, this approach has led to the
supervising court assisting inferior tribunals, administrative boards and
boards of arbitration by not only correcting or overturning their decisions
but also providing needed remedies, not otherwise available. 8
The belief that a superior court can provide a remedy if one is required
to prevent an injustice and to justify this on the basis of inherent jurisdiction
may flow from and be confused with the court's application of the ancient
maxim ubi ius ibi remedium. This theory has been recognized and acted
upon by English courts since the fourteenth century. By the seventeenth
century the maxim appears to have been recognized as an established
principle of law39 and is still applied by English and Canadian courts.40
The difference between the maxim and inherent jurisdiction is
explained by Taitz in his book as follows:
The reason for the maxim is the fact that it fulfills an obligation of the
court to the aggrieved party who has come to the court for relief and has
34. Re Killam Estate, supra note 32 at 208.
35. Supra note 2.
36. Supra note 2 at 34.
37. R v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, [1952] 1 All ER 122 at 127 (CA).
38. See the Nova Scotia case of Haines, Miller & Associates v Foss (1996), 153 NSR (2d) 53 (SC).
39. The case of Ashby v White (1703), 2 Ld Raym 938, is just an example from the time period.
40. For more recent cases see: Constantine v Imperial Hotels, [1944] 2 All ER 171; Best v Samuel
Fox & Co, [1950] 2 All ER 798; and Pleau v Canada (Attorney General), 1999 NSCA 159, 182 DLR
(4th) 373 at 391 per Cromwell JA (as he then was).
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not taken the law into his own hands. Where the aggrieved party has a
substantial right, the court owes him a duty to find a remedy.4'
By comparison, "[t]he inherent power of the Court is concerned with
justice and expediency while the principle ubi ius ibi flows from an ancient
unwritten custom or form of social contract between the Court and the
parties to any cause [of action] before the Court."42 The court may have to
create or modify a remedy using its inherent powers if it is to function as a
superior court with justice and good reason.
In all of the foregoing situations, it is suggested that courts may invoke
inherent jurisdiction as the justification or basis for their activities whereas,
in actual fact, the basis for their actions may indeed be more properly
attributed to other sources that have nothing to do with the nature and
attributes of a superior court.
With these general comments in mind it is relevant to ask how the
superior courts of Nova Scotia have approached the issue of inherent
jurisdiction. Have they recognized and exercised this amorphous
jurisdiction? If so, to what extent, and, in what kind of situations and
within what limits? How often is it invoked?
II. The Nova Scotia Court ofAppeal and inherent jurisdiction: a trilogy
It is significant that in the last nine years the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
has had the opportunity to consider the concept of inherent jurisdiction in
three separate cases. 43 This trilogy offers a useful and unique opportunity
to better understand issues of inherent jurisdiction. In Part III, the decisions
of Nova Scotia trial courts from 1853 to 2009, by comparison, provide
some additional insights into the approach of the Nova Scotia judiciary.
1. Goodwin v. Rodgerson (2002) -
In the first case, Goodwin v. Rodgerson,44 failure by a lawyer to file a notice
of intention to proceed with an action led to the prothonotary issuing an
order dismissing the action for failure to proceed in a timely matter pursuant
to Rule 28.11 of the Civil Procedure Rules of Nova Scotia (1972). The
trial judge held that Rule 28.11 clearly covered the situation and required
the prothonotary to issue the order to dismiss. Unfortunately, this type of
dismissal order was omitted from a list of orders that enabled the court
41. Supranote2at66.
42. Ibid at 93.
43. Goodwin v Rodgerson, 2002 NSCA 137, 210 NSR (2d) 42; Halifax (Regional Municipality) v
Ofume, 2003 NSCA 110, 218 NSR (2d) 234 [Ofume cited to NSR]; and Ocean v Economical Mutual
Insurance Co, 2009 NSCA 81, 281 NSR (2d) 201 [Ocean].
44. Ibid.
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to intervene in certain circumstances.45 Satisfied that the omission was a
legislative oversight, the Court of Appeal declared that the order of the
deputy prothonotary should be set aside on the basis of the court's inherent
jurisdiction to control its own process and prevent an injustice. The Court
of Appeal noted that inherent jurisdiction was a power which a superior
trial court enjoys "to be used when it is just and equitable to do so," 46 as
long as it was not used to effect changes in the substantive law. The Court
also noted that setting aside the order to correct the non-compliance with
procedural requirements did no injustice to the defendants.
It is important to note that in this case, the Court of Appeal justified
the exercise of inherent jurisdiction by the trial court on two grounds:
firstly, it was using inherent jurisdiction to control its own process which,
in this case, meant preventing an injustice. Secondly, the Court of Appeal
appeared to decide that a trial court could use its inherent jurisdiction
when it was just and equitable to do so. This latter basis of jurisdiction
finds its origin in the definition of inherent jurisdiction proposed by
Master Jacob and referred to in an earlier decision of Justice Hallett of
the Court of Appeal in Golden Forest Holdings v. Bank of Nova Scotia.47
In this case, Justice Hallett referred to Halsbury 's Laws of England for
a description and definition of the inherent jurisdiction of the court.48 A
close examination of the particular excerpt from Halsbury reveals that
it repeats the definition of inherent jurisdiction offered by Jacob in his
seminal article.49 It is also instructive to note that the Jacob's definition
of inherent jurisdiction and reference to "just or equitable" is also found
in the decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Montreal Trust Co.
v. Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd." which was subsequently
approved by the Supreme Court of Canada." Two points are worth noting:
first, the important influence the Jacob article has had upon critical
Canadian precedents, and-secondly, the considerable overlap shown by the
two grounds referred to by Hallett J. as justifying the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction, that overlap being the fact that justice is a large factor in
both.
45. This list is contained in Rule 59.05 of the 1972 Rules.
46. Goodwin, supra note 43 at para 12 quoting Justice Hallett in Golden Forest Holding v Bank of
Nova Scotia (1990), 98 NSR (2d) 429 (SC (AD)).
47. Ibid.
48. Halsbury's Laws ofEngland, vol 37, 4th ed (London, UK: Butterworths, 1982).
49. Supra note 2.
50. Montreal Trust Co v Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd (1971), 21 DLR (3d) 75.
51. Baxter Student Housing Ltd v College Housing Co-operative Ltd, [ 19761 2 SCR 475.
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2. HRM v. Ofume (2003)
In the second case, Halifax (Regional Municipality) v. Ofume 5 2 the issue
confronting the Court of Appeal was whether the plaintiff's husband, as a
non-lawyer, could represent her in a civil action before the Supreme Court.
Rule 9.08 specifically allowed a person to be represented by a solicitor or
represent themselves but made no provision for non-lawyer representation.
In this case, a Supreme Court Justice in chambers had exercised judicial
discretion and allowed the husband to represent his wife. It was this
decision that was appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.
Justice Saunders, for the Court, framed the question in terms of
whether a rule that purports to limit representation to a party or a solicitor
is sufficient to override the court's inherent jurisdiction. In addressing this
question, Justice Saunders first established that Canadian superior courts
do possess the inherent jurisdiction to control their own procedures by
making reference to and quoting from the Manitoba Court of Appeal
decision in Montreal Trust." He also noted that the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal had itself previously affirmed the principle of inherent jurisdiction
as it applies to the Supreme Court of the province in the following words:
The inherent jurisdiction of the court has been described as a vague
concept and one difficult to pin down. It is a doctrine which has received
little by way of analysis but there is no question it is a power which a
superior trial court enjoys to be used when it is just and equitable to do
so. It is a procedural concept and courts must be cautious in exercising
the power which should not be used to effect changes in substantive
law.54
Justice Saunders also observed that the Supreme Court of Canada in Baxter
Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Co-operative Ltd. had declared
that Montreal Trust "may well be cited as a paradigm of the exercise of
judicial discretion."" Referring to the rules of procedure, Justice Saunders
expressed the view that "[o]ur Civil Procedure Rules do not oust or
temper the court's inherent jurisdiction; rather they reflect its authority
and countenance its application."56 More specifically, he found that Rule
9.08 did not clearly or unambiguously bar non-lawyers from representing
parties before the court."
52. Supra note 43.
53. Supra note 49.
54. Ofume, supra note 43 at para 22, citing Goodwin, supra note 43 at para 17.
55. Supra note 50 at para 480.
56. Ofume, supra note 43 at para 39.
57. Ibid at para 34.
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As for the court's inherent jurisdiction to control its own proceedings,
Justice Saunders saw the control as fundamental to a court that derives
its power and existence not from statute but from the constitution. In
his view, this kind of jurisdiction gives rise to the "powers which are
necessary to enable [courts] to act effectively." 8 Justice Saunders then
listed the number of factors that should be considered by a superior court
when exercising discretion with respect to the question of whether or not
to allow lay persons to represent others before the courts of Nova Scotia.
He then concluded: "allowing judges to decide who may appear before
them on a case by case basis, rather than instituting an outright prohibition,
will better serve the interests of justice."59
We should note that the basis for the exercise of inherent jurisdiction
in this case was not the one declared in Goodwin, namely, when it is just
and equitable to do so. Instead, the emphasis in Ofume was on the ability of
the court to act effectively as a court, a power Justice Saunders described
as fundamental.
3. Ocean v. Economical Mutual Insurance Co. (2009)
The third case in our trilogy and the most recent, Ocean v. Economical
Mutual Insurance Co. 60 involves a situation where the provisions of the
Civil Procedure Rules and other statutory provisions did not specifically
cover the situation before the court. The circumstances in question involved
the mental capacity of a self-representing litigant to adequately represent
herself. The question was whether the court had jurisdiction to order a
mental assessment of the litigant when mental capacity was not an issue
to be determined on the merits of the case. The case presents a striking
example of the complexities involved in the decision of a court to exercise
inherent jurisdiction.
In Ocean, a self-represented litigant brought an action against her
insurer and the driver of the other vehicle. The insurer declined to respond
to Ms. Ocean's motor vehicle accident claim. The insurer brought a motion
for an order which required the insured to be assessed by an independent
medical expert to determine her competency to represent herself in the
proceeding. The trial judge concluded that the evidence presented to the
court had satisfied the court that it was appropriate to order a psychiatric
examination of Ms. Ocean to determine the issue.61
58. Ofume, supra note 43 at para 40.
59. lbidatpara4l.
60. Supra note 43.
61. Ocean v Economical Mutual Insurance Co, 2008 NSSC 282, 274 NSR (2d) 80 [Ocean SC].
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With reference to the issue whether the court had the necessary
jurisdiction or authority to make such an order, the trial judge noted that
Counsel for the insurance company had relied on Rules 22 and 23 ofthe Civil
Procedure Rules (1972) or, in the alternative on the inherent jurisdiction
of the court to make such an order. Adopting a liberal interpretation, the
trial judge found that Rule 23 allowed for the issuance of such an order but
declared that if she were in error in this regard she was fully satisfied that
it was appropriate to use the Court's inherent jurisdiction to issue such an
order. Inherent jurisdiction thus became a back-up authority if such were
needed for the court to make the order. The trial judge further explained
that her reason for making the order was because, in her words:
I have an obligation as a trial judge to help to [e]nsure that the parties
to this action receive a fair trial. In order to [e]nsure that the plaintiff
receives a fair trial, I must be satisfied that she is competent to represent
herself in these proceedings. 62
The trial judge also specifically stated that she was not in any way finding
that Ms. Ocean was incompetent (to manage her own affairs generally).
In response to this decision, Ms. Ocean contended that the judge was
without jurisdiction to order the assessment and, even if the court did have
such authority, it should not have been issued in these circumstances. Ms.
Ocean therefore asked the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal the
decision and this request was granted.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that neither Rule 22 nor 23
authorized the court to order a psychiatric assessment of a litigant's mental
competency in these circumstances. The Court first noted the lack of
case law in Nova Scotia to support such an order and, secondly, that the
equivalent rule had been most commonly interpreted in other provinces as
being used only to assist the court in interpreting evidence and not to create
evidence in order to prove a fact in issue. As a result, the Court of Appeal
concluded that Rule 23 could not be used to appoint a medical practitioner to
ascertain the mental competency of a party to litigation where competency
was not a fact in issue in the proceedings.63 The Court had also, earlier in
its decision, pointed out that the Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules did not
contain a procedure for determining the competency of a person, nor did
they contemplate a status between competence and full incompetence.
Without either a statutory or rule' basis for jurisdiction, the only
other possible basis upon which the court could rest its decision to
62. Ocean SC, supra note 61 at 84.
63. Supranote43 at 221.
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order the psychiatric assessment was for the court to rely on its inherent
jurisdiction.
Addressing the issue of inherent jurisdiction, the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal observed that this particular issue had never been dealt with
or the inherent jurisdiction of the court used to issue such an order in the
past. There were no precedents. Nevertheless, in spite of the lack of clear
precedent, the Court of Appeal was prepared to assume in exceptional
circumstances that inherent jurisdiction could be invoked for this purpose.
At this point in the judgement, the Court of Appeal does not explain what
exceptional circumstances might involve nor the basis for the invocation
of inherent jurisdiction as a basis for action. As we shall see, Justice
Bateman, later in her judgement, does give examples of exceptional
circumstances which, if presenting themselves, would justify the court
using its inherent jurisdiction. Additionally, however, by assuming the fact
and availability of inherent jurisdiction, the question that then arises is
should that jurisdiction be exercised? In this sense, inherent jurisdiction
is optional rather than mandatory and involves the exercise of judicial
discretion upon the question of its use.
The importance of this question is emphasized by Justice Bateman
who also notes that it must be exercised judicially.M On this point. Justice
Bateman appears to have adopted the approach outlined by Jenkins L.J.
in the English case of Grimshaw v. Dunbar65 The exercise of judicial
discretion according to this approach seems to involve an exercise whereby
the judge takes into consideration all relevant circumstances and excludes
all irrelevant considerations from the determination whether to exercise
inherent jurisdiction and take action or not and outlines these considerations
in the court's decision. With this definition as a guide, Justice Bateman
then lists all the relevant considerations that the trial judge should have
taken into account when making her decision to order a mental assessment
of Ms. Ocean.66 These include the following:
(1) A fundamental precept is that an adult person is presumed to be
competent to manager her own affairs.
(2) A competent adult is entitled to access justice, either personally
or be represented by a lawyer.
(3) Civil Procedure Rules do not outline a procedure for having a
person declared mentally incompetent.
64. Ocean, supra note 43 at 225.
65. Grimshaw v Dunbar, [1953] 1 All ER 350 at 353.
66. Ocean, supra note 43 at para 89ff.
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(4) The statutory vehicle to address issues of competency is the
Incompetent Persons Act.67
(5) The Incompetent Persons Act provides an all-or-nothing approach
to incompetence. Only where a person is, by reason of mental
infirmity, incapable of managing her own affairs, both real and
personal property, is a guardian appointed. There is no category of
partial incompetence such as litigation incompetence, which was
the focus in this case. There was no suggestion that Ms. Ocean
was incapacitated in this way. None of Ms. Ocean's extended
family and friends have indicated that she was not capable of
managing her own affairs.
(6) The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Swain 6 has confirmed that
respect for the autonomy and intrinsic value of all individuals
is a basic principle underlying our legal system. This includes
respect for individual decision making in matters of fundamental
importance.
(7) There is no suggestion that this is a vexatious action or that Ms.
Ocean is abusing the process of the court. Although Ms. Ocean
may have difficulty confining her oral or written submissions to
material which the Judge and opposing counsel view as clearly
relevant to her case, she is able to provide a rational explanation
that connects her reference to her writings and discoveries to the
matters at issue in the litigation.
(8) The transcripts of the proceedings reveal that Ms. Ocean is
articulate, coherent, respectful in court and responsive to
directions from the Judge.
(9) The court's inherent jurisdiction is an extraordinary power rooted
in controlling contempt of court or abuse of the court's process
and should not be used except in the clearest cases.
(10) Ms. Ocean's family doctor provided a note attesting to her
capacity.
(11) The report prepared by the psychologist who treated Ms. Ocean
for post-traumatic stress disorder in 2005, and available to the
psychiatrist who testified at the hearing did not raise any concern
about her competence.
67. Incompetent Persons Act, RSNS 1989, c 218.
68. Rv Swain, [1991] I SCR 933.
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(12) Permitting an opposing counsel to raise the question of a party's
mental capacity in a proceeding sets a dangerous precedent.
(13) The limited cognitive capacity test applied in criminal proceedings
does not require that an accused, even one whose liberty may be
at risk, has the ability to make choices about the conduct of the
litigation which are in her best interests.
Justice Bateman concluded that since the trial judge failed to take into
account such relevant circumstances, she was in error in issuing a mental
assessment.
A close examination of the trial judge's reasons for judgment indicate
that she did in fact consider the family doctor's note but was of the opinion
that it was too brief to be useful and did not adequately deal with Ms.
Ocean's situation.6 9 The trial judge also had the report of a psychiatrist
who described Ms. Ocean as delusional, but was. not prepared to declare
her incompetent. As already noted, the trial judge was very concerned that
Ms. Ocean receive a fair trial. In order for this to be accomplished, the trial
judge said that she needed to be satisfied that Ms. Ocean was competent
to conduct the litigation. This concern for a fair trial and the duty of any
trial judge in this regard was not mentioned by the Court of Appeal as a
relevant consideration. Perhaps it was considered to be irrelevant. Being
an oral decision, it is not surprising that the trial judge mentioned fewer
relevant considerations than did the Court of Appeal.
It is also interesting to note that Ms. Ocean did undergo a psychiatric
assessment to determine her fitness to conduct litigation on her own behalf
but the report had not been delivered to the Court prior to the appeal. Had
it been available, we can only wonder whether a Court of Appeal would
have considered it a relevant consideration.
Although Justice Bateman's ultimate decision was that the order for
mental assessment should not have been issued because all of the relevant
considerations had not been taken into account by the trial judge, she did
suggest that a court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction and issue such an
order in exceptional circumstances. Fortunately, Justice Bateman provided
guidance on this matter by suggesting that exceptional circumstances
could involve the following:
(1) A situation where the litigant poses a threat to the personal safety
of the judge.
69. Supra note 43 at para 83.
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(2) The litigant's conduct otherwise amounted to an abuse of the
court's process such as causing unacceptable delay and vexatious
or frivolous claims.
(3) Where there were no statutory provisions to cover this situation
or address the issue.70
In this case, according to the Court ofAppeal, Ms. Ocean's conduct did not
fall within (1) above and did not involve (2); however, (3) was satisfied.
It is not clear that proving or establishing any one of the three situations
would meet the test of exceptional circumstances or whether all three are
required. A review of Nova Scotia cases shows our courts having to deal
fairly frequently with situations where conduct is considered to constitute
an abuse of process or where there are no statutory provisions to cover
the situation. In the past, such circumstances have not been considered
exceptional and have resulted in the courts ordering a stay of proceedings
or dismissing an action. Perhaps it is the type of action being ordered here,
namely, an order to undergo a mental assessment, that is considered so
intrusive as to warrant limiting its exercise to exceptional circumstances.
On the other hand, denying a litigant the right to move forward with
litigation is also an important restriction but Nova Scotia courts have not
hesitated to use their inherent jurisdiction to restrict this right.
By assuming, without deciding, that the court had an inherent
jurisdiction to order a mental assessment of a litigant in exceptional
circumstances, the Court of Appeal appears to have accepted the reality
of inherent jurisdiction whatever its source might be. The Court does
so without any discussion of the basic nature or source of this inherent
jurisdiction or of its limits beyond the observation that in Nova Scotia,
courts have generally addressed what is not a proper exercise of the court's
inherent jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. Ironically, this is what the
Court of Appeal did in this case after exercising its discretion judicially.,
In the process of reaching a decision on the particular issue in Ocean,
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal made a number of observations about
inherent jurisdiction and its attributes including the following:
(1) In its earliest application, the concept was narrowly applied and
limited to issues involving contempt of court or other situations
that could be described as involving an abuse of the court's
process. Even in this narrow ambit, inherent jurisdiction was to be
exercised sparingly.71
70. Ocean, supra note 43 at para 99.
71. Supra note 43 at para 72 quoting Jacobs, supra note 2.
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(2) Over the centuries, the concept's application was expanded to
cover, among other things, the variation of trusts, safeguarding of
children, the provision of remedies and situations where statutory
provisions do not so provide, supervision, protection and assistance
to inferior tribunals (including arbitrations) and filling of gaps in
statutes. 72
(3) It is a vague concept difficult to pin down and has received little
analysis. Rather than trying to determine the limits of inherent
jurisdiction, Nova Scotia courts "have generally addressed what is
not a proper exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction on a case
by case basis.""7
(4) It is apparently used by a superior court when it is just and equitable
to do so.7
(5) It is primarily a procedural concept which the courts must be
cautious in exercising and should not be used to make changes in
substantive law.75
(6) Action taken pursuant- to inherent jurisdiction requires an
exercise of discretion. This discretion must always be exercised
judicially.16
(7) A judge does not have an unfettered right to do what is thought
to be fair as between the parties. A court's resort to its inherent
jurisdiction must be employed within a framework of principles
relevant to the matters in issue.77
Of these observations, Justice Bateman seemed particularly concerned
to emphasize that a judge does not have an unfettered right to do what
is thought to be fair as between the parties but must employ the court's
inherent jurisdiction within a framework of principles relevant to the
matter in issue. In so doing, she appears to be drawing back from what the
72. Ibid at para 73, quoting WH Charles, "Inherent Jurisdiction of Nova Scotia Courts" NS Law
Reform Commission (2005) at 7-8.
73. Ocean, supra note 43 at para 74 [emphasis in original].
74. Goodwin, supra note 43 at para 17.
75. Ibid.
76. Ward v James, [1965] 1 All ER 563 (CA).
77. ABN Amro Bank Canada v NsC Diesel Power Inc (1991), 101 NSR (2d) 361 (SC); and Golden
Forest Holdings, supra note 46.
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Court of Appeal had stated in the earlier case of Goodwin" and verifying
the earlier decisions in ABNAmro Bank7 9 and Golden Forest Holdings.s0
Secondly, her discussion of the judicial exercise of discretion provides
a second caution or braking action within the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. It will be interesting to see what effect this has on the future
use of this power by the courts. Will the need to develop a framework of
principles or an outline of relevant considerations that underlie a decision
to use inherent jurisdiction dampen the use of such jurisdiction by the
Nova Scotia courts?
It is also interesting to note that some of the principles outlined by
Justice Bateman as applicable to the exercise of inherent jurisdiction are
also considered relevant considerations with regard to the exercise of
discretion judicially. For example, a competent adult is entitled to access
justice, either personally or represented by a lawyer. It is not clear whether
the requirement for the application and discussion of relevant principles
in relation to the issue of inherent jurisdiction and the need for considered
relevant factors regarding the exercise of discretion are two separate
and different requirements or just different ways of expressing a single
requirement.
The Ocean decision is disappointing in one respect, that being the
lack of any discussion of the nature or source of this judicial power. It
is instructive to note that the first reaction of the Court of Appeal was to
determine if there were any precedents to support the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction in these particular circumstances. This is a typical approach
of a common law court and probably not surprising in that regard. It is
also the typical response of other Canadian courts as well. There is no
discussion of the source of the court's inherent jurisdiction but it does
appear that the court is looking for it in the common law.
4. Final observations
In all three cases the court was asked to use its inherent jurisdiction to
cover gaps or oversights in the rules. In order to do so, the Court of Appeal
in Goodwin" appeared to use the just and equitable basis of jurisdiction to
control its own process and to prevent an injustice. In the two remaining
cases, Ofume 2 and Ocean," the Court relied only on the control of the
78. Supra note 43.
79. Supra note 77.
80. Supra note 46.
81. Supra note 43.
82. Supra note 43.
83. Ibid.
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court's process as a basis for inherent jurisdiction. Fairness or injustice
was not a primary motive or at least was not expressed to be.
In Goodwin and Ofume the Court did in fact exercise its inherent
jurisdiction but in Ocean it did not do so. In the latter case there was no
exercise of inherent jurisdiction because it was questionable whether
competence to carry forward litigation in these circumstances amounted
to an abuse of the court process and there were other considerations
weighing against an assessment. The other party to the litigation may
have been frustrated by the actions of the self-representing party but not
disadvantaged sufficiently to be considered abused. In Ofume, Justice
Saunders made it clear that inherent jurisdiction actions involving court
control of its process were of greater importance than the jurisdiction to
correct substantive problems like attempting to plug a perceived statutory
gap. This is so, he explained, because control of the court process is
fundamental to a court that derives its powers and existence not from
statute but from the constitution.84 This suggests that vis-A-vis the court
process, the court has more leeway in what it can do. This may affect the
relationship between the inherent jurisdiction of the court and the rules of
court. It also suggests a hierarchy of powers within inherent jurisdiction.
In Ocean, the Court of Appeal's most recent decision" the Court
seemed concerned that exercising inherent jurisdiction on the basis of
what the Court might think was just and equitable provided too much
leeway for the exercise of judicial discretion and perhaps arbitrariness
unless controlled in sonfe way. The controlling mechanism that the Court
adopted involves a requirement that the court set out both the relevant and
irrelevant factors considered by the court in making a decision. In other
words, the court is required to outline or explain the reasoning that led to
the exercise of discretion to invoke its inherent jurisdiction.
III. Survey of reported decisions of the Supreme Court ofNova Scotia:
1853 to 2009
It was the unsettled view of inherent jurisdiction described in Part II of
this paper that prompted a survey of Nova Scotia trial court decisions to
assess the frequency with which the concept was invoked by these courts;
the specific situation in which it was invoked; judicial recognition of the
limits of the concept (if any); and the nature and source of the concept as
understood by the trial courts.
84. Supra note 43 at 245.
85. Ocean, supra note 43.
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The survey of reported decisions of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia
covered the time period 1853 to 2009. During this period there were 15,693
reported cases but only 97 referred to inherent jurisdiction. This represents
just a little more than one-half of one per cent of the cases." The earliest
reference to inherent jurisdiction occurred in 189987 although there had
been judicial references to a similar type of jurisdiction such as "powers
incident to every court"" or "inherent supervisory powers" prior to this
time.89
Although Nova Scotia trial courts appear to have invoked their inherent
jurisdiction sparingly, it was exercised by the court in 62 per cent of the
cases when proposed by counsel or discussed by the court. In cases where
it was not applied, the most prevalent reason was a conflict with statutory
provisions or the Civil Procedure Rules.90
As far as subject matter is concerned, survey results show that
inherent jurisdiction is most readily invoked when the issue involves the
court process itself and in this sense is procedural.9' But this is not the
only area of activity where the courts feel comfortable applying inherent
86. I am very much indebted to David Michels and Mark Lewis, staff members ofthe Sir James Dunn
Law Library, for providing valuable statistical information about reported cases and specifically those
cases in which inherent jurisdiction was an issue. For a more comprehensive and detailed analysis and
discussion of the survey results see Appendix "A".
87. See Holme v Taylor (1899), 32 NSR 791, in which counsel argued that the court had an inherent
jurisdiction to strike out frivolous pleas.
88. As in Re Hately (1884), 17 NSR 375, to correct mistakes.
89. Auchterlony v Palgrave Gold Mining Co (1897), 29 NSR 41, over the court's own powers.
90. These limits were imposed by the court in 15 cases, nine involving statutes: Rex v O'Neil &
Smith (1931), 56 CCC 379 (NS Co Ct); Re Wellington School Section and Trider (1944), 18 MPR
102; Geosam Investments Ltd v Keddy, 2004 NSSC 153, 226 NSR (2d) 19; Nova Scotia (Minister of
Community Services) v NNMand RDM, 2008 NSSC 72, 262 NSR (2d) 384; Re Donald-Reagh, 2008
NSSC 390, 272 NSR (2d) 282; Re Charles Brown (1928), 60 NSR 76 (SC); Re Lipsett Holdings Ltd
(2000), 212 NSR (2d) 207 (CA); Bast v Bast (1975), 20 NSR (2d) 604 (SC (TD)); R v Hardiman, 2002
NSSC 208, 208 NSR (2d) 24; Cameron v Excelsior Life Insurance Company (1979), 32 NSR (2d)
668, 104 DLR (3d) 706 (CA); Western Electric Ltd v International Brotherhood ofElectrical Workers,
Local 625, 2004 NSSC 129, 225 NSR (2d) 54; Melford Concerned Citizens Society v Nova Scotia
(Minister ofthe Environment) (1999), 181 NSR (2d) 52, 560 APR 52 (SC); Lyn-Gor Development Inc
v Canada (AG), 2004 NSSC 270, 233 NSR (2d) 325; Re Mombroquette (1928), 51 CCC 132, [1928]
NSJ no 4 (NSSC); and Francis v Haliburton (1975) 19 NSR (2d) 621, 24 APR 621 (SC (TD)).
91. Procedural cases are listed in Appendix "B". In 13 cases where the court exercised its inherent
jurisdiction, the action taken by the court could be described as an aspect of the court controlling
its own procedure: Carson v Montreal Trust Co (1915), 23 DLR 690 (NSSC); Fenerty v The City
ofHalifax (1920), 53 NSR 457 (SC); The King v Verge (1924-25), 57 NSR 235; The King v Fraser
(1907-08), 42 NSR 202; Re Wellington School Section, supra note 90; Lockwood v Brentwood Park
Investments Ltd (1970), 1 NSR (2d) 669 (SC); Sharma v Dartmouth & County East Residential
Tenancies Board(1979), 59 NSR (2d) 339 (SC); Widrig v Widrig (1981), 48 NSR (2d) 269 (SC); NsC
Corp vABNAmro Bank Canada (1992), 116 NSR (2d) 97 (SC); Snair vHalifax Insurance Nationale-
Nederlanden North America Corp (1994), 139 NSR (2d) 161 (SC); Oakland/Indian Point Residents
Assn v Seaview Properties Ltd, 2008 NSSC 209, 266 NSR (2d) 256; Miller v Staples (Estate), 2006
NSSC 183, 245 NSR (2d) 65; and R v Pottier, [1999] NSJ no 95 (CA).
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jurisdiction. Their historic role as supervisor of inferior tribunals is reflected
in the proportion of cases where either arbitrational awards are interfered
with,92 or inferior tribunals are controlled.93 Given that historically, the
royal courts exercised control over inferior tribunals by the issuance of
prerogative writs, it is not surprising that the courts should also feel free
to exercise some sort of inherent jurisdiction beyond the writs. These
two groups of cases taken together constitute 21 cases, representing 21.6
per cent of the total 97 cases surveyed; a significant area of operation.
Inherent jurisdiction also seems to be based on, and to include, remnants
of the Court of Chancery jurisdiction, particularly in the parens patriae
jurisdiction regarding children.94
The approach taken by the Nova Scotia courts to the question of
inherent jurisdiction appears to be the typical approach of common law
courts to any legal issue. The judge turns to precedent for guidance in
making the decision as to whether the situation is an appropriate one in
which to exercise the court's inherent jurisdiction. There is usually little
independent discussion or inquiry into the nature and source of the concept
itself. Instead, consideration is sometimes given to and reliance placed upon
the seminal article on inherent jurisdiction by Master Jacob," either directly
or indirectly via Halsbury 's. Jacob's definition of inherent jurisdiction is
considered particularly helpful. The limits of inherent jurisdiction are not
explored in any systematic way beyond noting potential or actual conflicts
with statutory provisions and rules of court.
92. Fifteen such cases were found by the survey: McAskill v Town of New Glasgow (1895), 40
NSR 58; New Glasgow v Milligan (1933), 1 DLR 748; Re Thomas Hackett (1939), 2 DLR 332; Re
Wellington School Section, supra note 90; Canadian Gypsum Co v Nova Scotia Quarry Works Union,
Local 294 (1960), 20 DLR (2d) 314; Town of Middleton v Dowell (1972), 3 NSR (2d) 880; Canadian
Keyes Fibre v United Paperworkers Intl Union (1973), 8 NSR (2d) 89; Canadian General Electric
Co ltd v Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers (1975), 11 NSR (2d) 550; Centennial Properties Limited v
Public Service Commission of Halifax (1975), 21 NSR (2d) 66; International Union v Volvo Canada
Ltd (1976),18 NSR (2d) 615; Dominion Bridge Company Limitedv Allen (1976), 23 NSR (2d) 135;
Bowater Mersey Paper Company Limited v Canadian Paper Workers Union, Salaried Workers, Local
243 (1977), 22 NSR (2d) 412; Sharma v Dartmouth & County East Residential Tenancies Board and
Pat King Investments Ltd (1979), 59 NSR (2d) 339 (SC); CUPE v School Board (1979), 40 NSR (2d)
43; and Dalhousie University v Embil (1988), 86 NSR (2d) 154 (SC). The Court in Canadian Gypsum;
Canadian Keyes Fibre; and Embil did not exercise its inherent jurisdiction because the Court found no
error of law on the face of the record.
93. This survey revealed six such cases, including the following: The King v Fraser (1907), 42
NSR 202 (SC); R v Halifax City Council (1962), 34 DLR (2d) 45, [1962] NSJ no 14 (SC); Canadian
Automatic Sprinkler Association v Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board (1974), 15 NSR (2d), [ 1974]
NSJ no 330 (SC TD)); Little Narrows Gypsum Co vLRB (1977), 24 NSR (2d), 82 DLR (3d) 693 (SC
(AD)); Walker v Keating (1973), 6 NSR (2d) 1, 42 DLR (3d) 105 (SC (AD)); and Re Amiro, [1940]
2 DLR 766, [1940] NSJ no 15 (SC). Fraser and Re Amiro are two cases in which the Court did not
exercise its inherent jurisdiction.
94. See Appendix "C" for a list of these cases.
95. Supra note 2.
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Court references to Jacob's article might be taken as evidence that
Nova Scotia courts have also accepted the explanation or suggestion that
inherent jurisdiction is in some way a metaphysical manifestation of the
immanent qualities of a superior court. Our review of Nova Scotian cases
does not support this conclusion. Quite the contrary, it suggests that history
and necessity have been the source of the court's inherent jurisdiction.
The trilogy of Court of Appeal cases9 6 provide a number of statements
or observations about the nature of inherent jurisdiction and its use by
the Nova Scotia trial courts. A comparison of such observations with the
survey results, which reflect the actual application of inherent jurisdiction
is instructive. In several instances the observations of Justice Bateman in
Ocean"l are confirmed by the action of trial court judges. For example,
trial judgments corroborate the fact that Nova Scotia courts have, in the
past, made no attempt to independently determine the nature and source
of inherent jurisdiction. Similarly, the survey confirms the expansion
of inherent jurisdiction from its historically narrow base in contempt of
court. Additionally, the accepted characterization of inherent jurisdiction
as primarily procedural is also confirmed.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeal's concern with the danger of
trial courts using what is just and equitable or fair as a basis for invoking
their inherent jurisdiction does not appear to be reflected in trial court
decisions. Less than ten cases are documented.98 As. a potential source of
arbitrary decisions, the just and equitable rational suggested by Jacob 99
does not appear to be a significant threat. However, the Court of Appeal's
other concern with the need for the trial courts to articulate the rationale
behind any decision to exercise inherent jurisdiction is supported by the
evidence of heavy reliance by Nova Scotia courts on case precedents to
support their decisions. This is particularly problematic since most of the
precedents relied upon do not provide an explanation or justification for
the use of inherent jurisdiction. Also troubling is the fact that in 13.3 per
cent of the cases, Nova Scotia courts applied inherent jurisdiction without
reference to any precedent or other authority. Perhaps these courts thought
their jurisdiction was self-evident.' 0
96. Supra note 43.
97. - Ibid.
98. In three cases the court made direct reference to Jacob's article. In six other cases the term
"just and equitable" was used by the court but without direct reference to Jacob or to his definition of
inherent jurisdiction: see e.g. Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v NNM and RDM, supra
note 90; and Quigley v Willmore, 2008 NSSC 353, 272 NSR (2d) 61.
99. Supra note 2.
100. Supra note 91.
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The lack of any theoretical boundaries for the concept of inherent
jurisdiction was noted by Justice Bateman in Ocean'01 and the fact that
decisions are made on a case-by-case basis was also confirmed by the
survey. Beyond suggesting that inherent jurisdiction is primarily a
procedurally based concept, Nova Scotia trial courts have not tried to
articulate a more general or theoretical explanation or definition of its
limits. For a more comprehensive discussion of the results of the survey,
see Appendix "A".
IV. Superior courts: the limits of inherent jurisdiction
As previously observed, neither courts nor legal commentators have tried
very hard to define the limits of inherent jurisdiction with any degree of
precision even though the issue of limits is one of the questions consistently
asked and which deserves an answer.102 No doubt the fact that the concept
itself is amorphous, ubiquitous, and pervasive makes a'determination of
its limits extremely difficult. However, there are three elements that can
be identified as placing some limits on inherent jurisdiction even though
they do not provide answers as to limits with regard to specific situations.
These three elements are procedural; statutes; and the rules of court. Each
will be discussed in turn.
1. Procedural limitations
Although Master Jacob notes the need for an answer to the question of
inherent jurisdiction limits, he makes no effort to provide one. He does,
however, describe inherent jurisdiction as part of procedural law and
emphasizes that it is not part of substantive law. His examination of the
features of inherent jurisdiction which reveal close connections with the
rules of court, practice and procedure, as well as litigation, support the
view that inherent jurisdiction has decided ties to procedural matters.
If we consider that procedure and procedural law has as its objective
to give effect to substantive law, it can be looked upon as subordinate to
substantive law and therefore of less importance and perhaps easier to
change. Judicial creativity with procedural rules using inherentjurisdiction
as a vehicle may be seen as less constitutional and objectionable than
juridical reform of substantive law. However, a matter which may appear
as procedural from one point of view may pose constitutional questions
from another. Procedure can effect substantive rights under the guise of
process. Just being able to label an action as procedural does not necessarily
101. Supra note 43.
102. Jacob, supra note 2 at 23.
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make the question of limits any easier to determine even though it may
limit the inquiry to some degree.o 3
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has accepted the fact that inherent
jurisdiction is a procedural concept and that courts must be cautious when
exercising this power to make sure that it is not used to effect changes in
the substantive law. The Court has also rejected the notion that inherent
jurisdiction provides the courts with "an unfettered right to do what, in the
judge's opinion, is fair as between the parties."'0 On the contrary, according
to the Court of Appeal, when a court resorts to inherent jurisdiction it must
do so within a framework of principles relevant to the matter in issue. 0
As one legal commentator observed, any argument that a court has
inherent jurisdiction to order anything it thinks necessary to do justice in
pending proceedings is too vague and unpredictable to be treated as having
the quality of law'06 and has been unequivocally rejected by English courts
in several cases. 07
On the other hand, and at the opposite end of the spectrum, is the
suggestion that inherent jurisdiction be limited to circumstances only
involving contempt issues or the abuse of process or both, such as might be
caused by frivolous or vexatious activities.'0 As an additional restriction
to the more general procedural limitation, this would appear to constitute a
limit upon a limit and, as such, is too restrictive. It is an approach that has
been rejected by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Ofume.'09
The House of Lords has proposed a somewhat broader scope for the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction by suggesting that the terms inherent
power and inherent jurisdiction be confined to "the doing by the court of
acts which it needs must have power to do in order to maintain its character
as a court of justice.""10 Even this limitation is subject to considerable
interpretation and one legal commentator has suggested that Lord Diplock
really did not intend to define and restrict the end of the court's inherent
powers in the way suggested and that "it is more likely in the context
that the sentence in question was merely intended to discourage the use
103. Dockray, supra note 2 at 131.
104. Ocean, supra note 43 at para 77.
105. Ibid..
106. Dockray, supra note 2 at 128-29.
107. See e.g. The Siskina, supra note 27; and Dockray, supra note 2 at 129.
108. See e.g. Orpen v Ontario (AG) (1925), 2 DLR 366 (SC).
109. Supra note 43. Justice Saunders expressed the view at para 25 that inherent jurisdiction was
broader in scope and that Canadian courts maintain a general inherent jurisdiction which includes the
discretion to confine their own powers.
110. Per Lord Diplock in Bremer Vulkan, supra note 28 at 909.
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of 'inherent jurisdiction' to refer to the supervisory jurisdiction of the
Court."'
Dockray suggests that an examination of English cases during the.
period 1978 to 1985 in which the courts denied that they had inherent
jurisdiction to make a procedural order of some kind provides evidence
that even within the general area of procedure there were limits to the
ability of inherent jurisdiction to fashion new powers. Some of these
restrictions enumerated by Dockray include where there is no inherent
jurisdiction to: recast the law of discovery; award security for costs against
a defendant; give a defendant summary judgment against a co-defendant;
detain a party or witness in order to coerce another to comply with a court
order; make interim payment orders; order compensation to be paid to
someone who has suffered by implementation of an order of the court;
order the production of hospital records in terms that disclosure is not
made to the applicant or his legal advisor; back date orders; and introduce
a rateable allocation scheme to share a limited insurance fund among
competing claimants."12
A study of Nova Scotia cases where the court has denied the right
to apply its inherent jurisdiction include the following: Francis v.
Haliburton-no authority to set aside the decision of another judge in
chambers by a judge in chambers;" Nova Scotia (Minister of Community
Services) v R. Petel-the court cannot substitute its own decision for that of
the Minister and the court cannot order a non-parent to pay maintenance;'' 4
Lyn-Gor Development-the court is unable to relax the rules regarding
residency and security for costs;"' R. v. Hardiman-the court cannot vary
bail conditions under s. 527 of the Criminal Code unless the Criminal
Code authorizes it;" 6 Re Donald-Reagh-there is no power in the court to
revise a consumer proposal which has been annulled or deemed annulled
and there is no discretion to forgive a redeemed annulment;"'7 Excelsior
Life Insurance Company-no power to set aside a perverse jury verdict;"'
and Bast v. Bast-no power to reduce the amount of maintenance."'
A comparison of Dockray and the Nova Scotia cases shows little
similarity between them. The Nova Scotia cases appear to involve more
111. Dockray, supra note 2 at 129.
112. Ibid at 130.
113. Francis, supra note 90.
114. Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v R Petel (2007), 253 NSR 177 (SC).
115. Lyn-Gor Development, supra note 90.
116. Hardiman, supra note 90. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.
117. Re Donald-Reagh, supra note 90.
118. Excelsior Life Insurance Company, supra note 90.
119. Bast, supra note 90.
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issues that have a substantive law element to them and are less procedural
in nature. The lists represent good examples of the difficulties involved in
labeling a provision procedural or substantive. Overall, the comparison
provides little clear guidance as to the limits of inherent jurisdiction, even
within the confines of so-called "procedural law."
2. Legislative restrictions
A court cannot exercise its inherent jurisdiction powers if to do so would
produce a conflict with clear legislative provisions. Providing the legislative
intention is clearly and unambiguously expressed, it cannot be overridden
by the exercise of judicial inherent jurisdiction. Parliamentary supremacy
prevails. Both the Supreme Court of Canada and the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal have made it clear that legislative provisions can place limits on
the exercise of inherent jurisdiction by the courts.12 0
What is the situation where there is not a clear conflict between the
statutory provisions and the exercise of inherent jurisdiction but both
exercise power within the same area of law? Jacob offers the opinion that
the court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction even about matters that
are regulated by statute or rules of court so long as it can do so without
contravening any statutory provision.' 2'
Another commentator suggests: "The mere fact that some statute
or rule of court enables the court to deal with a particular problem in a
particular way will not usually exclude inherent powers to deal with it [the
same problem] in other ways."' 22 This seems reasonable but Mason goes
on to suggest that "indeed the jurisdiction may be asserted even though
the conduct complained of may be in literal compliance with some statute
or rule of court if it would prevent a party obtaining a collateral advantage
which it would be unjust for him to obtain." 23
It is conceivable that statutory provisions could expressly exclude the
judicial exercise of inherent jurisdiction but this would be a rare occurrence.
If legislation is introduced into an area.of law without such an exclusion, it
may not be clear whether the legislative intention is to exclude or abolish
the exercise of inherent jurisdiction or whether it is intended to provide a
supplement or an alternative to the common law process. However, if the
120. In Baxter, supra note 51 at 480, Dickson J declared: "In my opinion the inherent jurisdiction of
the Court of Queen's Bench is not such as to empower a judge of that Court to make an order negating
the unambiguous expression of the legislative will." The effect of this order made was to alter the
statutory priorities which a court simply cannot do. To a similar effect, see the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal decision in Re Lipsett Holdings Lid, supra note 90.
121. Supra note 2 at 24.
122. Mason, supra note 2 at 449.
123. Ibid, citing Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, [1982] AC 529.
92 The Dalhousie Law Journal
legislative provisions are sufficiently detailed, courts will usually defer
and refrain from exercising their inherent jurisdiction. This does not, of
course, prevent the courts from closing apparent gaps in the statutory
provisions.
A review of Nova Scotia cases suggests a variety of approaches. There
appears to be uniform agreement that ifthe words of the statute are clear and
unambiguous and in conflict with the application of inherent jurisdiction,
the latter cannot be exercised.12 4 But of course that still leaves the court
free to fill any gaps in the statutes that might exist. In the situation where
the statute is not in conflict with the exercise of inherent jurisdiction but
covers the same situation or area of the law, the Nova Scotia cases are not
completely uniform in their approach. There is at least one case where the
court has taken the position that, in such circumstances, the court cannot
exercise its inherent jurisdiction. 2 5
However, in Dalhousie University v. Embil, the Court held that
although the legislature had enacted statutory provisions governing
arbitrations, the inherent jurisdiction of the court was still alive and of
a broader sweep than the legislative provisions such that the court had
power to enjoin the arbitration proceedings.126
3. Rules of court
Athird potential limitation upon thejudicial exercise ofinherentjurisdiction
exists in the form of the rules of court. Because of the way the rules of
court are created in Nova Scotia, a more detailed and comprehensive
examination of the relationship between the rules and inherent jurisdiction
is required.
In Nova Scotia, s. 46 of the Judicature Act 27 authorizes the judges of
the Supreme Court, or a majority of them, to make rules for carrying the
provisions of the Judicature Act into effect. More precisely, among other
powers, the judges are authorized to "regulate the pleading, practice and
procedure in the Court and the rules of law which are to prevail in relation
to remedies in proceedings therein." 28
More generally, the Judicature Act states that judges are authorized
to make rules:
[F]or regulating any matter relating to the practice and procedure of
the Court, or to the duties of the officers thereof, or to the costs of the
124. See supra note 90 for a list of such cases.
125. Wellington School Section, supra note 90.
126. Embil, supra note 92.
127. Judicature Act, RSNS 1989, c 240.
128. Ibid at s 46(b).
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proceedings therein and every other matter deemed expedient for better
attaining the ends of justice, advancing the remedies of suitors and
carrying into effect the provisions of this Act, and of all other statutes in
force respecting the Court.' 29
It is clear that the Judicature Act provides broad powers to the court to
control its own process, to provide remedies to litigants and to do justice.
The question that arises is what effect do the rules of court have upon the
court's inherent jurisdiction? The answer to this question may depend upon
the legal status of the rules. Are they the equivalent of statutes (primary
legislation), subordinate legislation (regulations) or just the equivalent of
practice directions from the court?
In England, because the Rules ofthe Supreme Court's0 provide that the
rules are to regulate and prescribe the practice and procedure of the court,
it has been suggested that where there is a conflict between the rules and
inherent jurisdiction, the rules will override.' ' This is presumably because
they have legislative support and confirmation as to their purpose.
In South Africa, the rules of court are considered to be subordinate
legislation and therefore according to South Africa law, can be overruled
by the court's inherent jurisdiction in case of a conflict. 32
In Ontario, the rules of court are created by a non-judicial rules
committee. Judges have input into the formulation of the rules but it
is the committee that determines their final content. The rules are then
enacted as regulations under the authority of the Courts of Justice Act'
and subject to the approval of the Lieutenant Governor. 3 4 Unlike Ontario,
the Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules are created by the judges alone.
Section 51 of the Judicature Act provides for the tabling of any new rules
before the Nova Scotia legislature within 20 days of their formalization. 35
This section further stipulates that the Legislative Assembly can ask the
Lieutenant Governor to cancel any new rules. In effect, the Legislative
Assembly, while not required to confirm or ratify the judges rules, can
veto them if they think they are inappropriate. This power has never been
exercised but the fact of its existence means that the judiciary does not
have complete or final rule-making power, at least theoretically. It might
be argued that when the Legislative Assembly does not veto any new rules
129. Supra note 127 at s 46(j).
130. Rules of the Supreme Court (Amendment) 1990.
131. Dockray, supra note 2 at 128.
132. According to Taitz, supra note 2 at 12.
133. Courts ofJustice Act, RSO 1990, c 43, s 66.
134. The process is described by Saunders JA in Ofume, supra note 43 at para 36.
135. Supra note 127.
94 The Dalhousie Law Journal
of court it is impliedly consenting to or ratifying them and thus raising
them to the status of a legislative enactment rather than just the rules of
the judges.
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Ofume noted the different roles
played by the legislature and the judiciary in the rule-making process
in Ontario and.Nova Scotia.' Justice Saunders noted that the Attorney
General for Nova Scotia did not have a hand in the creative process
nor were the. rules subject to the approval of the Lieutenant Governor
in Council.' However, having noted the difference between the two
provinces and their processes, the Court did not go further and suggest or
explain what was the legal impact of these differences.
A closer examination of Justice Saunders' decision in which he was
attempting to distinguish the Nova Scotia process of rule-making from
that in Ontario, shows that Justice Saunders emphasized a number of
points that are relevant to the status of the Nova Scotia Rules. Firstly,
Justice Saunders seems to suggest that the Nova Scotia Rules do not
have the same legal effect as do the Ontario Rules because they are not
as clearly a product of the legislative process. As such, they can be more
easily or readily ignored in the case of a conflict with the court's inherent
jurisdiction. Secondly, he also notes that the rules generally do not oust the
inherent jurisdiction of the court and in fact countenance its use. Thirdly,
by referring to the historical origins of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, he
appears to suggest that the inherent jurisdiction in Nova Scotia is stronger
or has more legal impact than in other provinces. Fourthly, as a matter of
policy, he expresses the opinion that in the case of a situation involving
legal representation, inherent jurisdiction is best determined on a case-by-
case basis. Finally, in the area of court process, Justice Saunders sees the
role played by inherent jurisdiction as being particularly important.'
In Ofume, Justice Saunders was able to determine that the rule in
question, Rule 9.08 was ambiguous and clearly did not deal with the
situation in issue. 3 9 As a result, there was no conflict between the inherent
jurisdiction and the rule. His other comments regarding the relationship
between inherent jurisdiction and the rules of court were not necessary
for his decision but are certainly instructive regarding the view that the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has of the legal effect of the civil procedure
136. Supra note 43 at paras 36 and 37.
137. Ibid.
138. Supra note 43 at para 34.
139. Ibid at para 30, where Justice Saunders explains: "that section on its face does not meet the
Baxter Housing and Montreal Trust Co. tests of unambiguously removing the inherent jurisdiction of
the court."
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rules vis-A-vis inherent jurisdiction, at least as of the date of Ofume. In this
narrower context of court process and the still narrower context of litigant
representation, the role of inherent jurisdiction is particularly strong,
according to the Court of Appeal, and in the event of a clear conflict may
override the rule or rules.140 Certainly the Court of Appeal in Goodwin
seemed prepared to override a rule of court if this were necessary.
We must keep in mind the fact that Justice Saunders was doing
his best to differentiate or distinguish the Nova Scotia Rules from the
Ontario Rules in order to avoid the application of an Ontario case as a
precedent. The differences noted by Justice Saunders might be somewhat
overemphasized.
If we revisit the Judicature Act,14 1 we see that it seems to give the rules
at least the status of regulations passed pursuant to the authority of a parent
statute. The process may not be identical to that of Ontario but it is roughly
the equivalent or similar to the situation in the United Kingdom. In spite of
the comments by Justice Saunders, which seemed to imply that in the case
of a conflict involving litigant representation, inherent jurisdiction would
override the rules of court, he nevertheless appeared to accept the general
proposition that if a situation arose where there was a conflict between the
Civil Procedure Rules and inherent jurisdiction, the Rules would override.
This was apparent from the reference to the Manitoba Court of Appeal
decision in Montreal Trust,'42 which was subsequently approved in general
terms by the Supreme Court of Canada.143 It would seem that the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal considers the Civil Procedure Rules more than just
practice directions from the judiciary. If this were not the case and if the
Nova Scotia Rules were not considered to have the status of a statutory
provision, or at least that of a regulation, the Nova Scotia courts would
find themselves in the awkward situation of having to reconcile a conflict
between judicially created non-statutory practice directions (rules) and
the judicial discretion embodied in the concept of inherent jurisdiction. In
having to choose one over the other, the court could always say that it had
changed its mind about the rules. For example, in Ofume the Rules had
been enacted in 1972'" and the decision took place some 30 years later. If,
however, the rules of court are considered to have any statutory status at
all then allowing inherent jurisdiction to override the rules of court would
offend the principle of supremacy of Parliament and the position taken
140. Ibid at paras 40 and 41.
141. Supra note 127.
142. Montreal Trust, supra note 50.
143. Baxter, supra note 51.
144. The latest version of Civil Procedure Rules was published in 2008.
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by the Supreme Court of Canada in Baxter.145 In light of the subsequent
decision in Ocean,14 6 the result implied by Justice Saunders in Ofumel47
may not actually occur in the case of a direct conflict between a rule and
inherent jurisdiction in other situations. Although Ofume and Ocean have
similarities in that both involved gaps and litigant representation in court,
the Court of Appeal in Ocean appeared to be taking a more cautious
approach to the use of inherent jurisdiction generally.'48
If we accept for the moment that the Rules in Nova Scotia and
elsewhere are a product of the legislature then what is the relationship
between inherent jurisdiction and the rules of court? The trilogy results are
indecisive and far from conclusive on this question. Master Jacob seems.
to be ambivalent because at one point he describes inherent jurisdiction
powers as a most valuable adjunct to powers conferred by the rules which
can be used to fill gaps in the rules.149 By so doing he gives the impression
that the rules are predominant, legally speaking. He further states that one
set of powers supplements and reinforces the other, apparently referring to
inherent jurisdiction as the re-enforcer. iso However, he also states that the
powers conferred by the rules of court are generally speaking additional to
and not in substitution of the powers arising out of the inherent jurisdiction
of the court, and in any given case the court can proceed under either or
both heads of jurisdiction unless there is a conflict.'"' He also notes that
inherent jurisdiction is broader in its reach than the rules. 5 2 However, he
does not discuss the consequences of a possible conflict between the two
sources of court jurisdiction.
Justice Saunders in Ofume acknowledges the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Baxter that inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised
so as to conflict with a statute or rule.'53 In case of a conflict, the rule
prevails but the rule must be clear and unambiguous. Mason agrees and
stresses that the rules of court cannot exclude inherent jurisdiction from a
particular area by implication alone. 54 Another legal commentator, Jerold
145. Supra note 51.
146. Supra note 43.
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid. According to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, not only did the situation in which the court
sought to exercise its inherent jurisdiction have to be exceptional, but the exercise of that jurisdiction
had to be explained.
149. Supra note 2 at 50; the author discusses the relationship between inherent jurisdiction and the
rules of court.
150. Ibid.
151. Jacob, supra note 2.
152. Ibid.
153. Supra note 43 at para 24.
154. Mason, supra note 2 at para 24.
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Taitz, goes even further and suggests that subordinate legislation in the
form of rules of court or like regulations does not bind the court.' While
acknowledging that the court will usually follow the rules of court where
these are applicable, in appropriate circumstances the court, according
to Taitz, may act contrary to them."' This view clearly sees inherent
jurisdiction being of a higher order than the rules of court.
If we compare inherent jurisdiction and the rules of court in terms
of their nature and function, historically the inherent jurisdiction of
the courts predates the normal creation of rules of court even though it
might have operated in a rather narrow area involving contempt of court.
Functionally, inherent jurisdiction casts a broader shadow than the rules
and can permeate all procedures at all stages. Inherent jurisdiction can
also fill in gaps left by the rules.' As far as individuals are concerned,
inherent jurisdiction can be invoked with regard to persons not themselves
actually litigants in pending proceedings.'
Rules, on the other hand, are more precise and can regulate with some
precision circumstances in which the court can apply coercive measures
for disobedience or non-compliance with the rules or orders (contempt).
Both inherent jurisdiction and the rules can impose sanctions such
as costs. In some cases the apparent inherent jurisdiction rule becomes
codified as is the case with vexatious or frivolous claims in Nova
Scotia. 9
In situations of conflict and as.suming that the rules have legislative
confirmation, the supremacy of Parliament and legislation and
constitutional principle means that inherent jurisdiction gives way to
the rules. However, it has been suggested that inherent powers are often
asserted to prevent a party who strictly complies with the rule from
obtaining a collateral advantage which would be unjust for that person
to obtain.160 Indeed in Nova Scotia we have examples where Nova Scotia
courts have used their inherent jurisdiction to override court rules when
justice requires this to be done.' 6' Inherent jurisdiction seems to have a
155. Taitz, supra note 2 at 12.
156. Ibid.
157. An important finding recognized by Jacob, supra note 2 at 51.
158. Jacob, supra note 2 at 51.
159. See e.g. Rule 14.25 of the Civil Procedure Rules (1972) and Rule 88 of the 2d ed (2008).
160. Mason, supra note 2 at 458.
161. Hiscock v Pasher, 2008 NSCA 101, 302 DLR (4th) 325 (failure to provide a notice of intention
to proceed in a timely manner); Van de Wiel v National Life Assurance Co of Canada, 2002 NSSC 209,
208 NSR (2d) 221; and Lyn-Gor, supra note 90. In Lyn-Gor the Court, guided by Ofume, recognized
the authority of the court to make its own rules and control its own process, and declared that the court
.had inherent jurisdiction to vary the rules if the situation warrants it (at para 24).
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distinctly equitable aspect to it that the courts will not refrain from using
when necessary.
If a rule is enacted with regard to a particular issue whether narrow
and precise .or broad in its coverage, the question becomes whether the
fact that the area is now governed by a rule of court means that the court's
ability to exercise inherent jurisdiction in the entire area is lost so that
there can be no co-existence with the rule.
It has been argued (by counsel) that the mere enactment of rules of
procedure as a total package means that the legislature has taken over
procedural matters leaving the judges with no inherent jurisdiction
to exercise with regard to court processes.162 As we have already seen,
Justice Saunders in Nova Scotia has declared that the Nova Scotia Rules
do not oust or temper the court's inherent jurisdiction but rather reflect and
countenance the court's authority. 16 As products of the judges themselves,
we should not be too surprised by this assessment. But other jurisdictions,
where it is clear that the rules are the product of the legislature, have not
adopted this position or suggested that the rules as a package are intended
to eliminate inherent jurisdiction completely. The result is that inherent
jurisdiction can co-exist with the rules in the absence of conflict. The issue
of which is subordinate is only really important when there is a conflict
between them. However, it is also important if the question is one of
implication, such as when a narrow rule is enacted within a larger area or
when the courts have either exercised inherent jurisdiction in the past or
have the potential to do so. If inherent jurisdiction is considered to be the
predominant jurisdiction, supplemented by the rules, then the strength of
any implied exclusion is lessened.
In the latest version of the Civil Procedure Rules we have several
examples of situations that were formally dealt with by the courts using
their inherent jurisdiction which are now covered by the new rules. Rule
88, entitled "Abuse of Process," begins by stating "these rules do not
diminish the inherent authority of a judge to control an abuse of the court's
processes."'" It then goes on to outline pleadings for abuse of process and
the process for dealing with pleadings that are not sufficient to establish
a claim or raise a defense. This new Rule 88 is clearly intended to deal
with the general situation of the vexatious litigant and so-called frivolous
actions. The rule makes it clear that the court's inherent jurisdiction or
authority has not been totally eliminated in this area.
162. Straka v Humber River Regional Hospital (2000), 51 OR (3d) 1.
163. Ofume, supra note 43 at para 39.
164. Nova Scotia, Civil Procedure Rules.
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In Ofume,165 Rule 9.08 of the 1972 Rules dealt with some situations
involving legal representation but not the issue that was before the Court.
This case could be seen as an example of a gap in legislative provisions
where inherent jurisdiction was put forward as the basis for filling that
gap. No conflict with any rule was established.
Rule 89 of the new Rules has detailed provisions regarding contempt.
These provisions primarily concern the procedure for starting and
conducting a contempt action. Rule 89 does not specifically give the judge
the power to issue a contempt order or establish under what circumstances
this might be done. These issues are left to the judge presumably exercising
inherent jurisdiction. This situation provides a good example of a sort
of shared jurisdiction involving both inherent jurisdiction and the rules
of court. Finally, in Excelsior Life Insurance Company, Justice Hart
(dissenting) expressed the opinion that Rule 34.09(4) of the 1972 Rules
took away the power to set aside a perverse jury finding from the court. In
this case no co-existence was possible. 66
A review of cases involving conflicts between inherent jurisdiction
and the rules provides mixed results. In six cases, the rule prevailed or
was upheld and in five cases, the court inferred or specifically stated that
inherent jurisdiction could be exercised to vary the impact of a rule where
it was necessary for the court to control its own process and to prevent
an injustice.16 7 The situations in which the court is prepared to do this are
usually considered to be exceptional.
Given these results the following observation of a member of the
legal community seems appropriate: "So long as judges are concerned
about injustices caused by delays, expense or technicalities of legislation
no rule relating to the administration of justice will remain sacrosanct
or incapable of further refinement."'16  This observation would seem
particularly appropriate in Nova Scotia where the rules are made by the
judges.
165. Ofume, supra note 43 at para 39.
166. Supra note 90 at paras 62-65.
167. The rule prevailed in the following: Excelsior Life Insurance Company; Western Electric Ltd;
Re Mombroquette; Francis; Melford Concerned Citizens Society; and Lyn-Gor Development, supra
note 90. The rule did not prevail against inherent jurisdiction in the following: Harrison v Leopold
No I (1950), 25 MPR 42 (NSCA) en banc; Blue vAntigonish District School Board (1990), 95 NSR
(2d) 118 (SC(TD)); Van de Weil, supra note 161; Hiscock, supra note 161; and Goodwin, supra note
43.
168. Mason, supra note 2 at 459.
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V. Inherent jurisdiction and arbitrations
Superior courts exercise supervisory powers over inferior courts and
tribunals on the basis of their ability to issue prerogative writs.169Arbitration
tribunals, being a mechanism created by private consensual arrangements,
are not subject in the majority of cases to prerogative writ control, but
they are subject to the exercise of a superior court's so-called inherent
jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, any examination of Nova Scotia cases regarding
jurisdiction over arbitration tribunals, particularly in the period 1853
to 1930, will inevitably lead us to English precedents as a basis for the
decisions of the Nova Scotia courts. Initially, perhaps in the early sixteenth
century, it appears that English courts considered themselves as being in
the position of courts of appeal who could examine whether the conclusion
reached was sound, both in point of law and in point of fact. However, in
the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century, English courts
appear to have adopted a new position and taken a hands-off approach to
private arbitrations.'7 0
It soon became apparent, however, that there were situations such
as misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, fraud, or misconduct in the
procurement of the arbitration, that cried out for a judicial remedy. As a
result, the Court of Chancery in particular was looked to and did provide
a remedy. In the early seventeenth century, it seems that it was possible
to have the awards of arbitrators reviewed in both the law courts and the
Court of Equity on the grounds of fraud; partiality or bias; want of due
notice; or wilful misconduct on the part of the parties or the arbitrator."'
On the other hand, the early history of court interference or intervention
with arbitration awards on the basis of error on the face of the award is
rather murky as the words of Lord Goddard in the case of Racecourse
Betting Control Board v. Secretary For Air suggest:
When and how the courts at Westminister first began to examine awards
and to set them aside for manifest error it is difficult to discover. They
certainly did in the 17th century, as it appears from an anonymous case
in 1698, and it seems that the court of chancery would entertain bills to
relieve against awards that contained apparent errors of law.172
169. According to Jowitt : Dictionary of English Law, 2d ed, prerogative writs are processes issued
upon extraordinary occasions on proper cause shown. Black h Law Dictionary, 9th ed, adds that they
are issued by a court exercising unusual or discretionary power. Examples of such writs include
certiorari, habeas corpus, mandamus, and prohibition.
170. Adams v Great North of Scotland Railway, [1891]AC 31 at 39 (HL).
171. Brown v Brown (1683), 1 Vern 157, 23 ER 384 at 385.
172. Racecourse Betting Control Boardv Secretaryfor Air, [1944] Ch 114 at 127 [emphasis added].
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Lord Goddard here refers to a manifest error in the arbitration award
and not just an error in law on the face of the award. However, in the
anonymous case referred to by Lord Goddard, Chief Justice Holt did not
refer to a manifest error. Instead he declared that "[t]he Court will not at
all enter into the merits of the matter referred to arbitration, but will only
take into consideration such legal objections as appear upon the face of
the award, and such objections as go to the behavior of the arbitrators."'
The term "manifest error" as used by Lord Goddard seems to suggest
something more serious than legal objections but perhaps Lord Goddard
was being cautious.
Thus, it would seem that the first legal authority by which a common
law court could set aside an award of an arbitrator was provided in 1698
by the anonymous case and was limited to legal objections or errors
that appeared upon the face of the award or objections that involved the
behavior of the arbitrators.174 The earlier case of Brown v. Brown in 1683
had concentrated upon the actions of the arbitrators rather than the legal
accuracy of their award.1 5 Whatever the position the United Kingdom
courts were taking in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and there
seems to be some doubt about what that was, the case of Kent v. Elstob
is now taken to be the case that created a new exception to the old rule
that the arbitrator's decision was considered conclusive upon the law and
the facts. This case, decided in 1802, established that the courts could
review an arbitrator's decision if an error of law. appeared on the face of
the record or in accompanying documents.'76
Up to the time of the Kent decision, courts had refused to set aside
or interfere with the arbitrator's award if the only ground for so doing
was that the arbitrator had made an error in arriving at his award. This
kind of error was not considered to fall within the accepted misconduct
exception. 77 But now, as a result of Kent, if the error of law appeared on
the face of the award or on accompanying documents the court could also
intervene.
The creation of this new exception to the general rule was confirmed,
with regret, by Williams J. in the case of Hodgkinson v. Fernie17 some fifty
years later. Subsequently, Hodgkinson was confirmed and approved by the
House of Lords in 1912 in British Westinghouse v. Underground Electric
173. Anonymous (1698), 1 Salk 71, 91 ER 66 at 66 (KB).
174. Ibid.
175. Supra note 171.
176. Kent vElstob (1802), 3 East 18, 102 ER 502.
177. Misconduct started to become one of the bases for court intervention.
178. Hodgkinson v Fernie (1857), 140 ER 712.
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Railroad.I" In this case, Viscount Haldane declared that the exception
was now "a well-established part of the law of the land."8 0 The Privy
Council, some twenty-one years later, agreed in Champsey Rhara and
Company v. Jivray Balloo Spinning & Weaving.'"' Interestingly enough,
both the House of Lords and the Privy Council referred to Hodgkinsonl82
rather than Kent'83 as the source of the new doctrine, in spite of the regret
expressed by Williams J.
A definition or explanation of what constitutes "an error in law on the
face of a record" was provided by Lord Dunedin in 1923 in Champsey.
He described it as a situation where the court "can find in the award or a
document actually incorporated thereto ... some legal proposition which
is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous ... and
the award will stand unless, on the face of it, [the arbitrators]. have tied
themselves down to some special legal proposition which then, when
examined, appears to be unsound."'84
Some of the different bases for judicial intervention in arbitration
awards were eventually reflected in English statutes. For example, the
Arbitration Act of 1698 only referred to arbitrations procured by corruption
or undue means as a basis for judicial interference. The jurisdiction to set
aside an award for misconduct (a more general term) was not added until
the Arbitration Act of 1889 was passed.'"' The third exception, that of an
error in law on the face of the award, was not included in the Arbitration
Act of 1889 as a statutory provision and is still not included in either the
English Arbitration Acts or those of Nova Scotia.186 .
Throughout the early part of the twentieth century, although counsel
continued to argue that the courts had an inherent jurisdiction to set aside
arbitration awards, the courts either did so without reference to any legal
authority, or they exercised jurisdiction on the basis that such a power
existed at common law or equity. Only the occasional judge, besides Lord
Denning, actually referred to inherent jurisdiction as the legal basis for
179. British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing v Underground Electric Railway Company of
London, [1912] AC 673. Their Lordships expressed a similar regret.
180. Ibid at 686.
181. Champsey Rhara and Company v Jivray Balloo Spinning & Weaving, [ 19231 AC 480.
182. Supra note 178.
183. Supra note 176.
184. Supra note 181 at 487-88.
185. Francis Russell & Anthony Walton, Russell on the Law ofArbitration 16th ed (London: Steven
and Sons Ltd, 1957) at 289.
186. The latest version being the Arbitration Act, RSNS 1989, c 19.
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the court's intervention.181 As late as 1981, the House of Lords referred
to this power to set aside the award of private arbitrators for errors in law
on the face of the award as "a confessedly anomalous jurisdiction [that
existed at common law]."' However, there was no reference to inherent
jurisdiction as a source of this jurisdiction.' 9
In conclusion, in 1802, Kent'9e created a common law exception to the
old rule that an arbitrator's decision was considered to be exclusive upon
the law and the facts. This exception is still operating today and provides
that a superior court can review an arbitrator's decision if an error of
law appears on the face of the record or on accompanying documents.
In subsequent centuries the common law rule in Kent'91 appears to have
morphed into an aspect of the court's inherent jurisdiction. By 1981, the
English courts seemed prepared to accept the fact that a court had some
kind of jurisdiction to correct errors of law appearing on the face of the
arbitrator's award. However, they refused to extend this jurisdiction to
include general supervisory powers in spite of the best efforts of Lord
Denning.192
This review of English decisions indicates that, apart from Lord
Denning, there is hardly any enthusiastic endorsement by English courts
of inherent jurisdiction as a power to be exercised broadly by the courts
with regard to arbitration awards. It is, at best, a hesitant approach which
recognizes court jurisdiction in a very limited area. Even in this limited
area involving error of law on the face of the award, this jurisdiction is
treated more like a common law rule of limited application that has been
created out of necessity rather than some power or jurisdiction that resides
inherently or immanently in the high courts.
187. Lord Green in Racecourse Betting, supra note 172 at 121, made reference to the inherent
power of the court to set aside an award on the grounds of error in law on its face; Lord Denning in
Northumberland, supro note 37, impliedly recognized the inherent jurisdiction of courts to review
arbitration awards for errors in law on the face of the award; in 1981, he went even further, arguing that
the courts had an inherent jurisdiction to exercise a general supervisory jurisdiction and specifically to
enjoin arbitration proceedings: Bremer Vulkan, supra note 28.
188. Bremer Vulkan, ibid at 978.
189. Supra note 176.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid.
192. Bremer Vulkan, supra note 28.
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The first clear reference to inherent jurisdiction'93 in a case involving
arbitration awards in Nova Scotia occurs in 1939 in the case of Re Thomas
Hackett.19 4 In this case, the Court resorted to inherent jurisdiction in an
effort to avoid an attempt by the parties in their arbitration submission
to prevent court intervention. Judge Doull indicated that the court had
inherent jurisdiction to intervene because parties had a common law right
and an equitable right to make an application to the court in cases of fraud
or other misdoing. No reference is made by Justice Doull to Kent'95 or
Hodgkinson 96 in this regard and, therefore, he is probably referring to
the situation in England which existed prior to these cases being decided
which did not include a right to intervene on the basis of an error in law.
To -further support the court's intervention, Justice Doull notes that
a misinterpretation of a contract that was the basis of the court dispute
is equated to an error of law on the face of the record. This reference
to an error of law on the face of the record appears to be a reference to
the rule in Kent'97 and Hodgkinsonl98 but there is no specific reference
made to these cases by Justice Doull. Interestingly enough, the Court notes
that such an error of law involving the interpretation of a contract also
constitutes misconduct on the part of the arbitrator under the Arbitration
193. A review of reported cases in Nova Scotia reveals that the first case of judicial intervention with
an arbitration award occurred in 1895. In McAskill, supra note 92, the Court pronounced an award bad
on its face because the issue of damages had not been properly dealt with by the arbitrator. Counsel had
argued that the Court of Chancery could only set aside an award when there had been misconduct on
the part of the arbitrators or when there was some other equitable ground for interference. Apparently
a failure to deal properly with the issue of damages was not considered to constitute misconduct of
a type that would warrant equitable interference. Justice Graham brushed aside the argument and
issued a declaration that the arbitrator's award was void. He cited no basis for his action and there
was no reference to the well established rule in Kent, supra note 176, or to inherent jurisdiction.
Justice Graham simply stated at 61, "1 cannot see why an action to set aside such an award will not
be open to the parties as a means of getting it out of the way, in order that the damages might be
properly appraised by other arbitrators or by some tribunal." Thus, a pragmatic solution was reached
but without any clear legal underpinning. Reference to the award being bad on its face may be taken
as some evidence that counsel or the court were aware of the rule in Kent (an error in law in the face
of the record or award) but counsel's reference to the Court of Chancery would suggest that any
judicial interference would have to be based on equitable jurisdiction which did not include or cover
the alleged defect in the award. Clearly, the concept of inherent jurisdiction was not in the mind of the
Nova Scotia court or counsel at this time. A second case in Nova Scotia did not occur until 1933 and
did not involve an error in law on the face of the record but instead, the qualifications of one of the
arbitrators. An award was set aside on this basis but without any reference to inherent jurisdiction or
any other authorities as the basis for the court's actions: New Glasgow, supra note 92.
194. Re Thomas Hackett, supro note 92.
195. Supra note 176.
196. Supra note 178.
197. Supra note 176.
198. Supra note 178.
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Act of Nova Scotia.199 Justice Doull concludes his decision by declaring
that it would make no difference whether the application to set aside the
award was made under the provisions of the Arbitration Act or on the basis
of the court's inherent jurisdiction to intervene.200 What is not clear is the
legal basis for the exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction by Justice
Doull. Was it a common law and equitable right to make an application
to the court to prevent this conduct, a ground that pre-dated Kent2 01 and
Hodgkinson,202 or was the basis for jurisdiction based on an error of law
on the face of the record? Either way, inherent jurisdiction as a concept
for the Nova Scotia court did not arise as some immanent attribute of a
superior court.
Re Thomas Hackett2 03 is the first Nova Scotia case of several that will
follow in subsequent years where the court suggests that a situation which
qualifies as an error in law on the face of the record can also form the basis
for setting aside the award as involving a breach of the provisions of the
Arbitration Act204 of Nova Scotia involving misconduct on the part of the
arbitrator.2 05
In 1959, the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia en banc decided the
case Canadian Gypsum,2 06 which would prove to be a valuable guide for
subsequent Nova Scotia courts as to the jurisdictional power of superior
199. Re Thomas Hackett, supra note 92 at 337. In question was the Arbitration Act, RSNS 1923,
c 227, s 14.
200. Ibid at 335.
201. Supra note 176.
202. Supra note 178.
203. Supra note 92.
204. Supra note 186.
205. The first consolidation of previously enacted legislative provisions governing arbitrations
was enacted in 1895 (An Act for amending and consolidating the Acts relating to Arbitration, SNS
1895 (58 Vict), c 7). It is closely modeled after the Arbitration Act, 1889 (UK), 52 & 53 Vict, c 49.
This Nova Scotia enactment contained two sections relevant to judicial intervention with arbitration
awards. Section II provides: "In all cases of reference to arbitration the court or a judge may, from
time to time, remit the matters referred, or any of them, to the reconsideration of the arbitrators or
umpire." This provision obviously confers upon the court considerable discretion as to when it would
be considered proper or desirable to remit a case to the arbitrators for consideration. Under such a
provision, the court does not act as a court of appeal, substituting its own decision for that of the
arbitrator, but merely sends the award back for a second look by the arbitrators. By contrast, section 12
provides that a court can remove an arbitrator who has misconducted himself and set aside the award.
The award can also be set aside if it has been improperly procured.
It is important to note that these are the only two statutory grounds that justify a court setting aside
an arbitrator's award and neither involve the arbitrator committing an error on the face of the award. In
other words, the common law rule in Kent, supra note 176, was not codified in the Arbitration Act of
1923 in Nova Scotia, supra note 199, perhaps because of the misgivings stated some years earlier by
Williams J in 1859 in Hodgkinson, supra note 178.
206. Re Canadian Gypsum and Nova Scotia Quarryworkers Union, Local 294 (1959), 20 DLR (2d)
319.
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courts in the province to intervene with arbitration awards. In Canadian
Gypsum, which concerned a labour dispute, the union argued that an
arbitration board was guilty of legal misconduct by committing an error
of law on the face of the award. The error of law alleged was the failure
of the board to recognize the legal right of employees to communicate
information and to peacefully persuade people not to cross the picket
lines. This appears to be a resort to the common law rule in Kent 20 7 and
Hodgkinson208 which, as we have seen, underpins the court's common law
inherent jurisdiction.
After reviewing the findings of the arbitration board and the grounds
for setting aside that award, Justice Parker of the Nova Scotia Supreme
Court outlined the scope of the court's jurisdiction, in a statement that has
been relied upon by a number of subsequent courts in Nova Scotia. He
stated as follows:
By s. 13(2) of the Arbitration Act, this court has power to set aside an
award by arbitrators:
1. When they have mis-conducted themselves; or
2. When the arbitration has been improperly procured; or
3. When the award has been improperly procured;
it also has power to set it aside under its inherent jurisdiction, for error in
law appearing on the face of the award. 209
In this statement it appears that Justice Parker was outlining the court's
jurisdiction as authorized by the Arbitration Act210 (item's 1, 2, and 3) as well
as the court's common law inherent jurisdiction. No authority is cited by
the Judge for the court's inherent jurisdiction but reference to error in law
appearing on the face of the record is quite certainly an indirect reference
to the rule in Kent211 and Hodgkinson. 212 Justice Parker concluded that the
burden was on the applicant to show that the conclusions reached by the
arbitrator had been achieved by the application of some wrong principle of
law. 213 That burden, in his opinion, had not been discharged. As a result, it
207. Supra note 176.
208. Supra note 178.
209. Canadian Gypsum, supra note 218 at 323 [emphasis in original].
210. As it appears in RSNS 1954, c 13.
211. Supra note 176.
212. Supra note 178.
213. Canadian Gypsum, supra note 206 at 331.
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is impossible to say upon which basis of jurisdiction Justice Parker would
have relied to set aside the award had the burden been met.2 4
Shortly after Justice Parker's decision in Canadian Gypsum2 15 was
rendered, the Supreme Court of Canada reached the same conclusion: that
lack of evidence to support an arbitration award could provide the basis
for setting aside that award.2 16 The Court could do so, said the Supreme
Court of Canada, either on the basis of an error of law on the face of the
record which supported the exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction, or
on the basis that such an error constituted misconduct under the statute.
The Supreme Court explained that the jurisdiction to set aside the award
on the basis of an error in law on the face of the record was a jurisdiction
that existed at common-law independent of-any statute. 2 17 It was a creation
of the common law. This position was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
eight years later in Port Arthur Shipbuilding.2 18
In Nova Scotia, there were two cases decided between 1970 and 1990
where the court was asked to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in situations
where there was neither an error in law on the face of the record nor any
action by the arbitrators that could be described as "misconduct" under
the statute. 2 19 The first of these cases occurred in 1979.220 The court was
asked to provide a remedy to a party who had missed a time deadline.
The court responded, setting aside the arbitration award using its inherent
jurisdiction and exercising its discretion to prevent an injustice being
done.
214. Port, Arthur Shipbuilding Co v Arthurs, [1969] SCR 85. Justice Parker, for the majority, has
been followed by a number of Nova Scotia courts in subsequent years: Canadian Keyes Fibre Co Ltd
v United Paperworkers International Union, Local 576 (1973), 8 NSR (2d) 89 (SC (TD)); Canadian
General Electric Co Ltd v Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, Local 9-832 (1975),
11 NSR (2d) 550 (SC (AD)); Dominion Bridge Company Ltd v Allen (1976), 23 NSR (2d) 135 (SC
(TD)); and Canadian Union ofPublic Employees v Colchester East Hants Amalgamated School Board
(1979), 40 NSR (2d) 43 (SC (TD)).
During the 1970s there were nine cases involving judicial intervention in the arbitral process:
supra note 92. The majority (six) involved labour matters and collective agreements: Canadian Keyes;
Centennial Properties; International Union; Bowater Mersey Paper; and Dominion Bridge, supra
note 92. Many involved the interpretation of the provisions of such agreements with allegations that
there was either an error in law on the face of the award or that such error constituted misconduct under
the provisions of the Arbitration Act, or both.
215. Supra note 206.
216. Vancouver (City of) v Brandram-Henderson ofBritish Columbia Ltd, [ 1960] SCR 539 at 550.
217. Ibid.
218. Port Arthur Shipbuilding, supra note 214.
219. Sharma, supra note 91 and Embil, supra note 92.
220. Sharma, ibid.
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The Court cited as its authority for this action a text entitled Russell
on Arbitration.22' Such an exercise of inherent jurisdiction goes far beyond
the narrow confines of "an error on the face of the award" as provided by
Kent.
A second case occurred in 1988 when the court was asked to enjoin
arbitration proceedings. 2 2 This would involve, of course, the court not
only setting aside the award after the arbitration process had concluded,
but, in this case, intervening before a decision had been reached. The Nova
Scotia Supreme Court signaled a willingness to enjoin proceedings and
supported the decision by a reference to Halsbury '.223
An examination of this reference shows that it is basically a
paraphrasing of Jacob's conclusion in his article that a superior court has
a reserve, residual source of power or jurisdiction which it can draw on
and use as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so.2 24 Although
apparently willing to assume jurisdiction on that basis to act, the Nova
Scotia Supreme Court did not have to do so. The Court decided that this
was not an appropriate situation in which to order an injunction. Thus
the scope of inherent jurisdiction at least in arbitration cases, was not
expanded.
In conclusion, what does the use of inherent jurisdiction by the courts
of the United Kingdom, the courts of Nova Scotia and the Supreme Court
of Canada in arbitration decisions tell us about the nature of this court
power?
Firstly, the power of the court to intervene in arbitration decisions
arose because of a right in both the common law and equity for a
disgruntled litigant to make an application to the court for a review of the
decision based upon fraud, bias or wilful misbehavior of the arbitrators.225
Secondly, an additional ground for review is added by the decisions of
the court in Kent226 and Hodginson.22 7 Both the right to make application
and the common law rule in Kent and Hodgkinson appear to constitute the
basis for the later claims of inherent jurisdiction by the courts to intervene
221. Russell, supra note 185 at 350. The author cited as authority the English Court decision in
Compagnie Financidre Pour Le Commerce v OY Vehna AB, [1963] 2 Lloyd's Rep 178 QB. In this
case the English Court remitted an arbitration award to an appeal committee, stating that it was in the
interest of justice to do so. The Court made no reference to inherent jurisdiction.
222. Embil, supra note 92.
223. Ibid at para 12.
224. Jacob, supra note 2 at 51.
225. Brown, supro note 171; Anonymous, supra note 173.
226. Supra note 176.
227. Supra note 178.
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in arbitration awards. Thirdly, both the Privy Council in England 2 8 and
the Supreme Court of Canada229 appear to believe that the source of this
inherent jurisdiction is in the common law rather than in some immanent
attribute of a superior court. Finally, any future attempts to extend the
inherent jurisdiction of the court in arbitration matters to a general
supervisory status seem doomed to failure. The decision of the House of
Lords in Vulkan230 as well as the cautious approach advocated by the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal in Ocean23 1 seem to almost guarantee this.
VI. Inherent jurisdiction of inferior courts in Nova Scotia
Courts such as the Nova Scotia Family Court or Small Claims Court,
created by statute as courts of record, are considered to be inferior courts
without inherent jurisdiction. Unfortunately, they still suffer the effect of
a politically motivated distinction created by Sir Edward Cooke in the
seventeenth century which was designed to give his royal or common law
courts an advantage over other newly created courts like the Star Chamber
and the Court of Equity. Coke declared that his royal courts were courts
of record with the power to fine and imprison for contempt, powers that
the other non-record courts did not have. As Sir William Holdsworth has
explained, this distinction created by Coke still remains as a technical
distinction which is of little practical importance today.23 2 So, for example,
although the Nova Scotia Family Court is a court of record it is still
considered to be an inferior court in the judicial hierarchy.
Attempts have been made to rationalize the distinction between
superior and inferior courts or courts of record and non-record on the
basis that the inferior or non-record courts only had such powers as the
creating statute gave them. 233 This explanation seems to accept a notion
of immanent inherent jurisdiction. Another explanation explains that
appeals from a court of record are triable by record only, (apparently
being more reliable) whereas appeals from a non-record court are triable
de novo. Neither of these explanations seem applicable today. Being a
court of record only means that certain royal courts kept a formal record
of proceedings before them and had the sovereign's guarantee that the
records spoke the truth, that it was infallible and subject to correction only
228. British Westinghouse, supra note 179.
229. Port Arthur Shipbuilding, supra note 214.
230. Supra note 28.
231. Supra note 43.
232. Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol 5 (Boston: Little, Brown & Company,
1924) at 160.
233. Shalin M Sugunasiri, "The Inherent Jurisdiction of Inferior Courts" (1990) 12:2 Advocates' Q
215 at 218.
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by a higher court.23 4 Since most so-called modem inferior courts can meet
this standard, it would seem that the argument for inherent jurisdiction in
the inferior courts is quite supportable.
1. The Commonwealth
In other parts of the Commonwealth and in the United Kingdom inferior
courts are considered to have a limited inherent jurisdiction. For example,
in England inferior courts such as the Court of Quarter Sessions and the
County Court being courts of record, can punish for contempt committed
in the face of the court.235 Inferior courts that are not courts of record cannot
punish for contempt, even in the face of the court, unless that power is
conferred by statute.2 3 6 County courts, on the other hand, have an inherent
jurisdiction to stay an action or to dismiss an action that is frivolous or
vexatious, both being considered an abuse of process. Jacob suggests that
perhaps these powers are not original but flow from the powers of the high
court that have been transferred to county courts by statute.237
Dockray suggests that inferior courts may possess at least some
inherent powers and asserts that "today a substantial number of English
cases recognise that inferior courts or tribunals may possess at least some
inherent powers orjurisdiction." 238 Examples include power to regulate their
own procedure, to make practice directions, to control abusive process, to
exclude the public if it becomes necessary for the administration ofjustice,
and to refuse to hear advocates who misconduct themselves. The existence
of such powers, Dockray suggests, is "inconsistent with the notion that
inherent powers are the exclusive prerogative of superior courts and that
they are the emanation of some unique characteristic of such courts." 239
The Privy Council has concluded that English Magistrates have the
inherent authority to determine who can appear before them and who can
represent a party's interest. 240
In Australia, inferior courts have the power to do a number of
things including: devise procedures and make rules to ensure the proper
determination of the issues before the Court; strike out pleadings; decline
to hear proceedings on the ground that they are an abuse of the powers of
the court or contravene the broad principles relating to double jeopardy or
both; set aside a decision if a person affected by it has been denied actual
234. Sugunasiri, supra note 233 at 217.
235. Jacob, supra note 2 at 49.
236. Ibid.
237. Ibid at 50.
238. Dockray, supra note 2 at 125.
239. Ibid at 126.
240. O'Toole v Scott, [1965] AC 939 (PC).
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justice; and control practices and procedures in the court. Inferior courts
have also been recognized as having these powers because the judges of
these courts, it is reasoned, should have the same concerns to prevent
abuse, delays and injustices as judges of superior courts.24 '
In South Africa, however, inferior courts are not considered to have
inherent jurisdiction and any cases that seem to suggest that magistrates
have some aspect of inherent jurisdiction can be explained, according to
Taitz, on the basis that these were powers that were considered incidental
to or implied from the statutory powers conferred. 242
2. Nova Scotia
In Nova Scotia, inferior courts include county courts, magistrates or
provincial courts, family courts and small claims courts. County courts
no longer exist but the survey of cases from 1853 to 2009 does involve
several county court cases where inherent jurisdiction was an issue.243 I
is relevant to note that the county court had both a civil and criminal
jurisdiction while the magistrate or provincial courts were limited to
criminal jurisdiction alone.
The survey of cases shows that these decisions on the inherent
jurisdiction of the County Court are mixed with some decisions stating
that the County Court did have inherent jurisdiction, particularly in matters
that fell within the old Chancery Court jurisdiction.2" For example, it was
.held that although the County Court did not have complete Chancery
jurisdiction, where a question of equity arises in a matter over which
the County Court could have jurisdiction, the Court can proceed on the
principle formerly administered by the Chancery Court.245
Similarly, it was decided that the County Court has power to set
aside a consent order, based on historical Chancery jurisdiction.2 46 To the
contrary, however, a decision has held that the County Court has no power
to provide a remedy in order to alleviate an injustice (historically, a power
that lay within the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery).247 With regard
to other powers, the cases indicate that the County Court may have the
241. Mason, supra note 2 at 456-57.
242. Supra note 2 at 50.
243. These include: Woodworth v Innis (1883), 18 NSR 295 (Co Ct); R v Mombroquette, supra note
90; White v Banks, [1937] 1 DLR 446 (Co Ct); Regina v Swift, [1969] NSJ no 116 (Co Ct); Lutz v Pyke
(1977), 36 NSR (2d) 420 (Co Ct); and CIBC v Whites Lake Services Ltd(1980), 56 NSR (2d) 236.
244. C1BC, ibid; and White, ibid.
245. White, ibid.
246. CIBC, supra note 243.
247. Swift, supra note 243.
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power to stay an action but definitely does not have the power to set aside
an order of another County Court judge.248
It has also been held that a County Court does not have the power to
amend the appeal affidavit.249 Counsel have argued that a County Court
Judge has the power to strike out a frivolous or vexatious claim even though
Rule 14.25 applied. 25 0 It would seem therefore that the County Court was
thought to have some inherent jurisdiction, a large portion of which was
based on the historical Chancery Court jurisdiction or powers.
All of the cases hold that the Magistrate or Provincial Courts do not
have a variety of powers including specifically: no inherent jurisdiction to
order separate criminal trials; 251 no inherent jurisdiction to award costs; 252
no power to order counsel to dress in a certain way;253 and no inherent
jurisdiction to make discretionary orders. 25 4 There are no cases which
seem to suggest that the Magistrate or Provincial Courts have any type
of inherent jurisdiction. In this sense, the position of the Magistrate or
Provincial Court is clearer and the decisions more consistent. Dealing
exclusively with criminal matters, the situation does not get complicated
by carry over of jurisdiction from the courts of equity as was the case with
the County Courts.
There is only one decision which emphasizes that the Small Claims
Court is a statutory court with no vestige of inherent jurisdiction. 255
Family matters are divided juristically between the Family Court
(inferior court) and the Family Court Division of the Supreme Court.
Once again, the historical jurisdiction of the Chancery Court has a role to
play. Specifically, the paternal jurisdiction or parens patriae is conferred
upon the Family Court Division of the Supreme Court as a result of the
carry-over of the old Chancery jurisdiction. The paternal jurisdiction is a
jurisdiction in virtue of which the Chancery Court acted on behalf of the
Crown as a guardian of all infants in place of the parents and as if it were
the parent of the child, thus superceding the natural guardianship of the
child.256
248. Mombroquette, supra note 90.
249. Woodworth, supra note 243.
250. Lutz, supra note 243.
251. Rex v O'Neil and Smith (1931), 56 CCC 379 (NS Co Ct).
252. R v Singh, 2009 NSSC 306, 283 NSR (2d) 266.
253. R v Samson (1974), 14 NSR (2d) 592 (SC (TD)).
254. Pottier, supra note 9 1.
255. Wexford Communications Ltd v Buildrite Centres Inc (1996), 156 NSR (2d) 78 (SC).
256. Re Murphy, Margaret, supra note 32 at 302-03 quoting The Queen v Gyngull, [1893] 2 QBD 232
per Lord Esher MR.
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The question that arises is whether this parens patriae jurisdiction
or any part of it was transferred to the Family Court (inferior court). The
cases appear to be unanimous in holding that it has not been transferred
because the Family Court is a statutory court.257
In conclusion, whatever inherent jurisdiction inferior courts should
theoretically have, it appears that the courts of Nova Scotia are consistent
in their assertions that the Small Claims Court, the Family Court and the
Magistrate or Provincial Courts do not have inherent jurisdiction of any
sort since they are statutory courts. However, the County Court, which
was also a statutory court before its abolition in 1992 is more problematic
in that this Court was considered to have some inherent jurisdiction which
found its source in the historical jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery.
Since the County Court no longer exists, the issue is moot except to the
extent that the County Court cases demonstrate the inter-relationship
between inherent jurisdiction and the equitable jurisdiction of the Court
of Chancery which still has an influence with regard to superior courts and
the family division of the Supreme Court.
If the court of record distinction is no longer valid and the metaphysical
concept of the source of inherent powers vesting solely in superior courts
is also suspect, and if inherent powers exist because they are a necessary
tool for our court to carry out its mandate, why should inferior courts not
have some form of inherent jurisdiction? It may be that there is a fear
that inferior court judges will not appropriately exercise the important
summary powers provided by inherent jurisdiction. With an improved
selection process and better salaries hopefully producing better qualified
Magistrates and Provincial Court Judges, as well as other lower level
judicial officers, it would seem to be preferable to recognize the need for
some kind of inherent jurisdiction and to concentrate upon determining
the areas of jurisdiction in which inherent powers can legitimately and
effectively be exercised by inferior courts and the scope or breath of these
inherent powers within particular jurisdictional areas.
VII. The inherent jurisdiction of the Court ofAppeal ofNova Scotia
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has declared that appellate
courts are statutory courts and have no inherent appeal jurisdiction.258 In
one case in particular, Kourtessis v. MN.R., Justice La Forest emphasized
the point with his observation that:
257. VS v JS, 2007 NSFC 34, 257 NSR (2d) 304; Pottinger v Hann (2003), 215 NSR (2d) 176; and
LLB v PBP (2001), 190 NSR (2d) 370.
258. Kourtessis v MNR, [1993] 2 SCR 53; R v Meltzer, [1989] 1 SCR 1764; R v Thomas, [1998] 3
SCR 535; R v W(G), [1999] 3 SCR 597; and Socidtd des Acadiens, supra note 32.
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Nowadays, however, this basic proposition tends at times to be forgotten.
Appeals to appellate courts and to the Supreme Court of Canada have
become so established that there is a widespread expectation that there
must be some way to appeal the decision of a court of first instance.259
In Kourtessis, the Supreme Court of Canada was dealing with a request for
a declaration that search warrants had been illegally issued.
Several of the cases referred to above involved criminal matters. It
might have been thought therefore that the comments by the Supreme
Court of Canada related only to appeals in criminal matters. However,
close reading of Justice La Forest's remarks makes it clear that he was
making these remarks with reference to the nature of rights of appeal
generally and not restricting himself to appeals in criminal matters.
By contrast, the English Court of Appeal in Aviagents, Ltd. v.
Balstravest Investments, Ltd.2 60 held that it had inherent power to control
its own proceedings, in a situation where an appeal was clearly being
inappropriately launched on a question of fact instead of law. The rules
of court governing the Court of Appeal procedure had not specifically
provided authority for the Court of Appeal to strike out a notice of appeal.
The Aviagents case seems to be the only example of an English Court of
Appeal exercising "inherent jurisdiction" and the House of Lords do not
seem to have commented on this issue either.
In Nova Scotia, Chief Justice MacKeigan in 1986 announced that the
Court of Appeal was not limited in jurisdiction as some statutory courts
may be and, in so doing, traced the history of the Court.2 6 1 That history
includes appeals heard prior to 1972 by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court.
In this configuration, trial court judges of the Supreme Court, when
required, would sit in panels of three to hear appeals. After 1972 and until
1992 appeals were heard by a division of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court.
From 1992 onwards appeals were heard by the newly-created Court of
Appeal. In Midland, Chief Justice MacKeigan for the Court observed
that the present Nova Scotia Supreme Court had the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia as originally established long before 1884.
Presumably these powers included inherent power. This jurisdiction, he
emphasized, included the same powers exercised by the English Court of
Queen's Bench, Court of Common Pleas, Chancery and Exchequer Court
as well as the same powers exercised by the Supreme Court of Judicature
in the UK as they were on April 19, 1884. This position and explanation
259. Kourtessis, supra note 258 at 69-70.
260. Aviagents, Ltd v Balstravest Investments, Ltd, [1966] 1 All ER 450 (CA).
261. Midland Doherty, supra note 29 at 237.
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was affirmed by the Nova Scotia Court ofAppeal ten years later by Hallett
J. for the Court in Future Inns Canada v. Nova Scotia (Labour Relations
Board). 262
It is interesting to note that in Midland, Chief Justice MacKeigan
made no reference to the Court of Appeal's "inherent jurisdiction" to
take action. Instead, he used terms like "ancient powers" and "vestigial
powers". Although different words, they would appear to be just another
way of referring to the court's inherent powers. This is clear from the
context in which these alternate phrases are used.
In Midland, the appellant wanted the Court of Appeal to reverse its
earlier decision and order The appellants invoked Rule 62.26(2) of the
Civil Procedure Rules which gave the court considerable powers and
authority to deal with appeals. Chief Justice MacKeigan rejected the
submission and pointed out that Rule 62.26(2) only permitted the Court
of Appeal to amend a former order but not to revoke it. As he explained:
Once a final order is issued on appeal this court has prima facie no
jurisdiction to open the appeal to grant a new hearing of the appeal or to
correct any substantive error made by it on the appeal; a party aggrieved
by our error must ordinarily look for remedy to the Supreme Court of
Canada, if appeal to that Court is available.263
It was in this context that the Chief Justice declared that although the
Court had no authority under the Rules to reverse its earlier decision and
order, it could under its "ancient powers" re-hear an appeal or part of an
appeal "where justice manifestly requires and had done so in the past
in exceptional cases. "26 However, Chief Justice MacKeigan concluded
there was no reason to do so in this case.
A somewhat similar situation appears to prevail in New Brunswick
and has been recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada. In 1986
the Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 8(2) of the New Brunswick
Judicature Act and its history gave the New Brunswick Court of Appeal
"inherent jurisdiction" to grant the Parents for Fairness in Education leave
to add a party to an action on appeal.265 A review of the history of s. 8(2)
showed that it vested the power of the Court of Chancery in the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal. The Acadian Society in this case had argued
that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to grant leave had to be found in
the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, the Rules did not set up any procedure
262. Future Inns Canada v Nova Scotia (Labour Relations Board) (1996), 154 NSR (2d) 358 (CA).
263. Midland Doherty, supra note 29 at para 5 [emphasis added].
264. Ibid at para 16 [emphasis added].
265. Societe desAcadiens, supra note 32 at 550-5 1. Judicature Act, RSNB 1973, c J-2.
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with respect to leave applications. In addition, it appears that in this case
neither of the parties had appealed and the time for appeal had expired.
Section 8(2) provides that "[t]he Court of Appeal shall have and
exercise appellate jurisdiction, with such original jurisdiction as may be
necessary or incidental to the determining of an appeal. 26 6 Justice La Forest
of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal (as he then was) had previously
reviewed the history of s. 8(2) and concluded that it had vested the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal with the powers of the Chancery Court. When
the case came to the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice Wilson agreed but
cautioned that the "inherent jurisdiction" of the Court of Appeal was not
unlimited since its invocation requires an exercise of judicial discretion
in accordance with accepted principles. These principles may be found in
statute or in inherited practice.2 67
In the same year, 1996, that Justice Hallett was adopting and confirming
Chief Justice MacKeigan's conclusions in Midland which was decided
ten years earlier, another justice of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal was
invoking the inherent power of the Court to take appropriate action where
justice required. In Brown v. Metropolitan Authority,2 68 the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal decided it had the power to order relief in the form of
an order of mandamus that had not been requested by the parties in. their
application before a Chambers judge of the Supreme Court. The Court
cited an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in which Justice Hallett,
speaking for the Court, had declared, "There is an inherent jurisdiction
in the court to take appropriate action where justice requires."2 69 Justice
Hallett then went on in this case to refer to Halsbury for a description
of inherent jurisdiction in support of his position.27 0 The difficulty is. that
Justice Hallett's reference to inherent jurisdiction of the Court was in the
context of a decision of a Supreme Court trial judge rather than a Court of
Appeal. The quotation from Halsbury 's similarly is made in the context of
the jurisdiction of a trial court and not that of a Supreme Court.
A review of other Court of Appeal decisions reveals a lack of
consistency in approach to the issue of inherent jurisdiction. Quite recently,
the Court has apparently taken the position that it is a statutory court and
derives its appellate jurisdiction from statute only.271 In this case the Court
266. Socidt des Acadiens, supra note 32 at 550-51 [emphasis added].
267. Ibid at 592.
268. Brown v Metropolitan Authority (1996), 150 NSR (2d) 43 (CA).
269. Ibid at para 78 citing ABN Bank Canada v NSC Diesel Power Inc (1991), 101 NSR (2d) 361 at
363.
270. Supra note 48 at 12.
271. R v Black, 2002 NSCA 72, aff'd 2002 NSCA 89.
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also maintained that it was not a court of original jurisdiction and could
not issue an order of prohibition, a position that seems to be at odds with
the decision in Brown.2 72
In other cases, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has held that it can
set aside the decisions of arbitrators273 and stay an action because it
was vexatious but had no jurisdiction inherent or original to hear cases
reserved from criminal courts or appeals or other applications apart from
statute.274
Although there appears to be some lack of uniformity within the Nova
Scotia Court ofAppeal as to the existence, source and extent of any inherent
jurisdiction it might have, Chief Justice MacKeigan's historical analysis
of the court's powers in Midland Doherty2 seems to provide sufficient
basis for concluding that the Court, like its counterpart in New Brunswick,
is not solely a statutory court. Just how extensive its non-statutory powers
are, however, is an open question. Clearly the scope enunciated by Chief
Justice MacKeigan and Justice Hallett allowing it to. take action where
justice required is very broad. Given the caution set out by Justice Bertha
Wilson to trial courts in the exercise of their discretion,276 and concern
expressed by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Ocean, a similar caution
directed to the Courts of Appeal seems required.
Conclusion
Our survey of cases from 1853 to 2009 has shown that the number of
cases in which the superior courts of Nova Scotia have actually exercised
their inherent jurisdiction is very small, some would say minute.2 77 There
are reasons for this but the fact remains that in these few cases and in a
somewhat larger group where the court actually considered whether or not
to exercise its inherent jurisdiction before deciding not to, there is potential
for judicial arbitrariness. Both the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court of Canada have cautioned against the use of inherent
jurisdiction except in very clear cases and have suggested methods to
limit the jurisdiction.
This paper has also demonstrated in its review of cases and courts
at every level that inherent jurisdiction is not just one jurisdiction but
272. Supra note 171.
273. Town ofMiddleton, supra note 92, in which Cooper JA, for the Court, declared that the Court of
Appeal had inherent jurisdiction at common law to set aside the decision of arbitrators which involved
an error in law.
274. Carson, supra note 91.
275. Supra note 29.
276. Socidt des Acadiens, supra note 32.
277. See Part III, above.
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several. A consideration of the declared purposes or functions of inherent
jurisdiction supports this view. Jacob himself, as part of his suggested
definition of inherent jurisdiction states that it is to be exercised particularly
but not exclusively for several purposes including the following: to assure
the due process of law; to prevent an improper vexation or oppression;
to do justice between the parties; and to ensure a fair trial.278 Other legal
commentators have suggested similar purposes, all of which emphasize
the importance of controlling the court process, of preventing abuse and
delay, and even promoting higher court standards.279
Such purposes stress and underline the procedural content of inherent
jurisdiction, but as Jacob suggests, allow for a certain amount of non-
procedural power to be exercised under the guise or label of inherent
jurisdiction.2 8 0 Nova Scotia courts have been shown to exercise portions
of the historic chancery jurisdiction by providing remedies, filling in gaps
in statutes and rules, varying trusts and protecting children via the parens
patriae doctrine.281 They also exercise the historical supervisory role of
supreme courts vis-A-vis inferior courts and tribunals, including arbitration
panels.
This examination of the functions or purposes of inherent jurisdiction
supports the conclusion of Dockray that inherent jurisdiction is not a single
jurisdiction which originates in the ineffable spirit of the court but is rather
"a rational collection of related common law powers, each of which has a
separate history, aims and boundaries. "282'
As to the source and nature of inherent jurisdiction, our survey
shows Nova Scotia trial courts adopting a typical common law approach
with reliance upon precedent as a guide in relation to issues concerning
inherent jurisdiction. 283 The Jacob article has had some influence on our
courts284 but on the whole, the emphasis has been on the control of the
trial process by the court and the subsequent need to have the necessary
powers to do this. The source of any so-called inherent jurisdiction is more
often found in the cases and the history of the common law and equity
than in the nature of the court. The fact that all levels of courts in Nova
Scotia have exercised some degree of inherent jurisdiction suggest that
278. Supra note 2 at 51.
279. Dockray, supra note 2 at 125-26; Mason, supra note 2 at 458.
280. Supra note 2 at 51, particularly the part of his definition that incorporates the concept of what is
just and equitable.
281. See Survey Results, Part 11, above.
282. Dockray, supra note 2 at 132.
283. Survey Results, Part Ill, above.
284. Survey Results, Part 1111, above.
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judicial necessity rather than metaphysical emanation is the source of
this jurisdiction. Even Jacob's article contains comments that support this
view. For example, he suggests that superior courts are bound to claim
that they have inherent jurisdiction because it is an indispensable adjunct
to all of their other powers.285 It is his view that inherent jurisdiction "is
a necessary part of the armoury of the courts [superior courts only] to
enable them to administer justice according to law."286 Furthermore, the
arbitration cases clearly demonstrate that the superior court's jurisdiction
or power to intervene in arbitration awards by overturning or sending
them back for reconsideration stems from the common law rather than
any inherent attribute of a superior court.28 7
As to the problem of uncertain limits, in one-third of the cases in
which inherent jurisdiction was invoked, it was denied or limited, either
by conflicting statutory provisions or rules of court, or by the exercise
of judicial discretion. 288 With regard to the rules of court, two points are
worth noting. One is the unique situation in Nova Scotia whereby the
rules are, in practice, the product of the judiciary rather than the non-
judicial body.289 Second, some aspects of inherent jurisdiction, such as
vexatious and or frivolous claims and parts of the contempt process, are
now governed by the provisions in the rules of court.290 Another more
general limitation exists in the accepted notion that inherent jurisdiction
is primarily procedural and cannot be exercised so as to effect substantive
rights.
If there is not one inherent jurisdiction and if inherent jurisdiction
does not spring from the unique nature of a Superior Court but is, instead
a judicial creation made necessary by the judicial function or purpose
of courts to administer justice efficiently, then, logically, inferior courts
should have at least some of the powers of inherent jurisdiction. They
may not have the equitable jurisdiction to create remedies or protect
children but there seems to be no reason to prevent them from having
some unwritten residue of power that enables them to control their own
court process.2 91
Despite the pronouncements from the Supreme Court of Canada292
that appeal courts generally have no inherent appeal jurisdiction, this does
285. Jacob, supra note 2 at 52.
286. Ibid.
287. Part V, above.
288. See Part VI, generally, and Part Ill, specifically, above.
289. See Part VI for a discussion of the Nova Scotia situation, above.
290. Part IV, above.
291. See Part VI, above, for a discussion of the inherent jurisdiction of inferior court.
292. Socidt des Acadiens, supra note 32.
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not appear to be the accepted position in Nova Scotia.293 Chief Justice
MacKeigan made it clear in 1986 that the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
was not limited in jurisdiction as some statutory courts may be. In spite
of this pronouncement there is still, however, some inconsistency in the
cases and there are decisions to the contrary.294 If, as seems to be the case,
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has come degree of inherent jurisdiction
it would seem advisable to keep in mind Justice Wilson's caution that
the application of inherent jurisdiction requires an exercise of judicial
discretion in accordance with accepted principles. 295 This approach echoes
that mandated by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal regarding trial courts
in Ocean.
Inherent jurisdiction as a residual pool of jurisdictional power that is
available to a court when needed, would seem to be a valuable judicial
tool. Its use by the judiciary, at least in Nova Scotia, does not appear to be
abusive in terms of the number of instances when it is utilized. It is subject
to certain limitations but, at the same time, its limits remain undefined in
some areas of that jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal in Nova Scotia has
suggested some control mechanisms to ensure a judicious use of judicial
discretion. On balance, the continued use of inherent jurisdiction by courts
should be welcomed as long as that power is used cautiously, as it seems to
be in Nova Scotia and in support of the judiciary's best efforts to maintain
and improve the litigation process as part of the administration of justice.
293. See Part Vll.
294. Midland Doherty, supra note 29.
295. Societ des Acadiens, supra note 32 at 592.
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Appendix A
Survey Results: Supplemental Data, Analysis and Discussion
I. Frequency of use
If the use of inherent jurisdiction by Nova Scotia trial courts is broken down into
smaller time frames we find that between 1853 and 1970 approximately 4,000 cases
were reported with inherent jurisdiction discussed or mentioned in 23 or .005%. In the
period 1970 to 1980, there were 2,471 reported cases with 24 cases involving inherent
jurisdiction or .009%. During the period 1980 to 2009 there were 844 reported cases
with inherent jurisdiction involved in 51 or .06%. The breakdown of reported cases














What caused the very significant increase in references to inherent jurisdiction
after 1970? Two factors appear to be responsible. Firstly, nine of the 24 cases were
cases involving private arbitrators (37.5%).291 This suggests a greater use of arbitration
as a dispute resolving mechanism in the seventies. Secondly, the seminal article by
I.H. Jacob, published in 1970, no doubt raised the collective awareness of the legal
community in Canada and elsewhere to the relevance and importance of "inherent
jurisdiction" as part of the court's authority.298 Perhaps the period 1980 to 2009 is
a more accurate measure of the use of inherent jurisdiction by more contemporary
Nova Scotian courts. In this time period there were 51 cases or 1.8 cases per year.
II. Early use of the term inherent jurisdiction
As to the use of the term "inherent jurisdiction," or similar terms by the Nova Scotia
courts in the latter half of the nineteenth century, such as in Holmes v. Taylor,299 their
choice of language may have been influenced by declarations of members of the
Supreme Court of Canada around that time. For example, in Re Sproule Canada's
296. The dramatic increase in reported cases from 1970 onward coincides with the publication of the
second series of the Nova Scotia Reports which began in that year. The first series reports covered the
period 1853 to 1929. From 1929 to 1965 Nova Scotia cases were reported in the Maritime Provinces
Reports. From 1965 to 1970, Nova Scotia cases were published in five volumes of Nova Scotia
Reports.
297. For a list of arbitration cases, see Appendix "B".
298. Supra note 2.
299. Supra note 87.
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highest court stated that "every superior court ... has incident to its jurisdiction an
inherent right to inquire into and judge of the regularity or abuse of its process."oo
In this same case, Strong J. specifically referred to the "inherent jurisdiction" of
the court to control its own process.3 0' Similarly, a decade later the Supreme Court of
Canada in Clark v. Phinney, considering the powers of the court of probate to correct
its own mistakes stated:
[A]II common law courts... like the Probate Court, with its common law powers
and all the powers of the old court of Chancery (so far as the administration of
the estates is concerned) as well, have inherent power and jurisdiction over their
own proceedings, and can in a proper case revoke or set them aside at will.3 02
A more direct reference to the term inherent jurisdiction was made by the Supreme
Court of Nova Scotia in The King v. Fraser30 in the context of the inherent jurisdiction
of a superior court to review all matters considered or decided by an inferior court.
However, the term was also used by some courts in Nova Scotia to distinguish the
original jurisdiction of the trial court from the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeal.'
III. Refusal to apply inherent jurisdiction
The court refused to invoke its inherent jurisdiction in 37 cases. In 15 cases the reason
was a conflict either with a statutory provision or a rule of court.3 0 In the remaining
22 cases, the court did not identify any external restriction on the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction but exercising discretion still decided not to invoke that jurisdiction as
the basis for court action. In some cases the facts precluded the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction or made its application unnecessary.3 0
IV. Subject matter breakdown
In terms of subject matter breakdown, the survey reveals a clear predominance of
procedural issues. These cases (34), represented 56% of the cases involving inherent
jurisdiction.0 ' Within this general category, the court acted in eight cases to control
vexatious or frivolous actions which the court considered to be an abuse of the court's
300. Re Sproule (1886), 12 SCR 140 at 180 per Ritchie CJ [emphasis added].
301. Ibid at 208.
302. Clark v Phinney (1896), 25 SCR 633.
303. Supra note 91.
304. The Queen v Mosher (1899), 32 NSR 139 (SC); Re Dominion Coal Co (1907), 42 NSR 108
(SC).
305. Supra note 90.
306. See e.g. Shatford v LeBlanc (1888), 20 NSR 373, Judge did not err-no need to correct pleadings;
Holmes, supra note 87, plea had to be false and it was not; Fraser, supra note 91, not the right factual
situation; R v La Brasseur (1997), 163 NSR (2d) 261, conduct of Crown counsel not so serious as to
justify the use of Court's inherent jurisdiction to award costs against Crown for misconduct. Several
cases involved arbitrations in which the court found as a fact that there had been no error in law on the
face of the record and therefore no need for the court to intervene: see e.g. Canadian Gypsum, supra
note 206; Dominion Bridge; Bowater Mersey; and Centennial Properties, supra note 214.
307. Supra note 91.
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process.3 08 In the remaining cases the NS courts exercised inherent jurisdiction to
perform a variety of actions. The second largest group of cases (16) are those in which
the court appears to be exercising what appears to be some aspect of the old Equity
or Chancery jurisdiction, but doing so under the rubric of inherent jurisdiction. These
cases are listed in Appendix "C". Of the sixteen cases. comprising this group, ten are
cases where the Nova Scotia court exercised its function as "parens patriae". In the
remaining cases, the courts acted to provide a needed remedy (two cases) as well as
exercising historical Chancery jurisdiction to correct a mistake, vary or alter a trust or
authorize the sale of trust property.
The third largest group of cases where Nova Scotia courts exercised their inherent
jurisdiction involved the court acting to affect the outcome of an arbitration proceeding
by ordering a stay or reconsideration of the arbitrator's decision.3 0 Of the fifteen cases
(25%) in which counsel urged the court to act, the court did act in 11 of these cases
representing 18% of the total. The role played by the courts as a supervisor based on
their exercise of inherent jurisdiction is examined more closely in Part III of this paper
in an attempt to demonstrate the historical evolution of inherent jurisdiction of this
one area of activity.
The last group of cases in which inherent jurisdiction was applied by Nova
Scotia courts involves the control by superior courts of inferior tribunals, excluding
arbitration awards. 10 Requested by counsel in six cases and applied by the courts in
four of the six, this area of inherent jurisdiction application constitutes 6.2% of the
total cases surveyed.
V. Justification for use: precedents, textbooks and Jacob
It is significant to note that in 86% of the cases where the court did acknowledge and
apply its inherent jurisdiction the courts supported the decision by referring to judicial
precedents in the form of either Canadian or English court decisions in which the court
had exercised inherent jurisdiction in similar circumstances. In other words, the courts
of Nova Scotia followed a typical common law approach to the question of inherent
jurisdiction. It is also important to realize that many of the Canadian precedents used to
support the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, had, in turn, relied on English precedents
to justify the use of this concept. These results point to the importance of English court
decisions in providing a judicial base for the exercise by Canadian superior courts and
the courts in Nova Scotia of inherent jurisdiction.
In addition to reference to cases, Nova Scotia courts also referred to textbooks to
support their exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Several of these dealt with arbitrations,
while others were textbooks on procedures which summarized Canadian court
decisions in which the court had exercised inherent jurisdiction. Only one textbook
referred to dealt directly and primarily with inherent jurisdiction (in South African
308. Holmes, supra note 87; The King v MacDonald (No 2) (1901), 5 CCC 279 (NSSC); Carson,
supra note 91; Fenerty, supra note 91; Hirtle v Hirtle (1949), 24 MDR 447 (NSSC); Canada (AG) v
Marineserve.MG Inc, 2003 NSSC 26, 212 NSR (2d) 140; Lutz, supra note 243; and 353903 Ontario
Ltd v Black & MacDonald Ltd (1999), 180 NSR (2d) 194 (SC).
309. Supra note 92.
310. See Fraser, supra note 91; Johnson v City of Halifax (1974), 12 NSR (2d) 562 (SC (TD));
Canadian Automatic Sprinkler Association, supra note 93; Little Narrows Gympsum, supra note 93;
Walker, supra note 93; and Re Amiro, supra note 93. In Fraser and Re Amiro the court did not exercise
its inherent jurisdiction.
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courts). In several cases the Nova Scotia courts referred to textbooks dealing with the
substantive law in particular areas such as trusts, company law or injunctions.
In all, there are ten cases with textbook references (10.3%) with approximately
half of these dealing directly with inherent jurisdiction. However, if we were to
include references by Nova Scotia courts to Halsbury Laws of England we would
add another ten cases making a total of 20 (26.6%), not an insignificant number.
The seminal article on inherent jurisdiction is considered to be that published by
Jacob in 1970. Direct reference to this article is found in eight Nova Scotia cases. Five
of these are Court of Appeal decisions decided between 1978 and 2009. However, if
we include court references to Halsbury between 1970 and 2009, there were 75 cases
in which inherent jurisdiction was an issue. The Jacob article was referred to either
directly or indirectly (via Halsbury ) in 24% of these, clearly a significant impact.
VI. Nature and source of inherent jurisdiction
It is clear from an examination of the Nova Scotia cases that there is not much
judicial appetite for a philosophical discussion of the nature and source of inherent
jurisdiction. Instead, we see an approach very similar to that described by Dockray
in his survey of English decisions on the issue of the existence of particular inherent
powers. As Dockray explains, "the cases recognize and reject claims after argument in
a conventional form about precedents which relate to the power in question and about
the merits, consequences and alternatives to the particular power which is claimed the
court possesses."" I Not surprisingly, it is the same approach that the courts would take
to any other question involving the common law.
It is Dockray's view that the most reliable guide to the scope and nature of
inherent jurisdiction lies in a group of cases in which the court has denied that it had
any inherent power to make a procedural order of some particular sort. A review of
these decisions revealed to the author that they were quite "inconsistent with the idea
that inherent jurisdiction is an unlimited reservoir from which new powers can be
fashioned at will."312 They also refute according to this author, the idea that inherent
powers can be discovered "by analyzing the character or immanent attributes of a
superior court." I would suggest that the performance of Nova Scotia courts leads to
the same conclusions. An examination of the denial cases mentioned by Dockray and
Nova Scotia courts will be made in the next section of this article dealing with the
limits of inherent jurisdiction.
Survey results and trilogy observations compared: a closer look
The trilogy of appeal cases contain a number of statements or observations about the
nature of inherent jurisdiction and its use by the Nova Scotia trial courts. The survey
of Nova Scotia cases provides evidence as to the actual application of this concept
and can provide some indication of the extent to which Nova Scotia courts understand
the nature of this particular jurisdiction. The comparison of the two should provide a
better overall understanding of the role played by this concept in the administration
of justice in Nova Scotia. We will start with a consideration of the Court of Appeal
observations and compare each observation with whatever empirical evidence the
survey provides.
311. Dockray, supra note 2 at 130.
312. Ibid.
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I. The nature of inherentjurisdiction and the impact of the Jacob article
In none of the three Court of Appeal decisions which constitute the trilogy,3' as
well as two other decisions that preceded that trilogy (Golden Forest Holdings3 14
and ABN Amro Bank"') was there any discussion about or analysis of the source
or nature of inherent jurisdiction. In all five cases, the Court of Appeal refers to
other Canadian or English cases, or a number of academic articles which discuss
inherent jurisdiction or both. Jacob's article was the most influential.316 This article
is referred to and quoted from for its definition of inherent jurisdiction as well as
other attributes of this concept. For example, Justice Saunders in Ofume appears to
quote with approval Jacob's explanation of the source of inherent jurisdiction which
he suggests is "derived from the very nature of the court as a Superior Court" and
that inherent jurisdiction is that "which enables the court to fulfill itself as a court of
law."" Other Justices of the Court of Appeal have been content to quote the words of
Jacob or other authors but without attempting to probe any further into the nature and
source of inherent jurisdiction. Clearly the Jacob article, either directly or indirectly
via Halsbury paraphrasing of relevant parts of it, had a significant impact upon the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.
Of a total of nine decisions where Jacob was referred to and quoted, five were
Court of Appeal decisions handed down between 1990 and 2009.31 The remaining
four were trial court decisions reported between 1978 and 2001.1" In terms of the
total number of cases reviewed, the nine cases represent just under one per cent of the
total. Not surprisingly, the trial courts do not try to explore in greater detail the nature
and source of inherent jurisdiction, being content to use the explanation and definition
being provided by Jacob.
II. The initial narrow application of inherent jurisdiction - abuse of court and
contempt
The Court of Appeal noted in Ocean, as have other legal commentaries, that the
initial exercise of inherent jurisdiction historically was limited to maintaining order
in the courtroom via contempt orders and trying to prevent the court process from
being abused.320 This latter objective provided a wider scope for the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction than the former and clearly covered cases involving frivolous or
vexatious claims. An examination of survey results shows the contempt power being
exercised or considered in only four cases by Nova Scotia trial courts.32 1 It might be
thought that contempt matters have been subsumed under statutory provisions but this
is only partially correct. The latest versioi of the Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules
does contain provisions that govern the procedure to be followed by the court where
313. Goodwin; Ofume; and Ocean, supra note 43.
314. Supra note 46.
315. Supra note 77.
316. Supra note 2.
317. Supra note 43 at para 40.
318. These include: Golden Forest Holdings, supra note 46; ABN Amro Bank, supra note 77;
Goodwin, supra note 43; Ofume, supra note 43; and Ocean, supra note 43.
319. See Bowles v Western Approaches Ltd (1978), 9 BCLR 226 (Co Ct); Embil, supra note 92; CIBC,
supra note 243; and 353903 Ontario Ltd, supra note 306.
320. Ocean, supra note 43 at 224 quoting Jacob, supra note 2.
321. Re SM(1987), 111 NSR (2d) 381 (Fam Ct); Begg v East Hants (1988), 85 NSR (2d) 304 (SC
(AD)); 353903 Ontario Ltd, supra note 306; Currie v Currie (1941), 16 MPR 187 (NSSC).
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contempt is involved but does not establish the circumstances in which the court can
invoke contempt proceedings.322 The court still has to decide on a.case-by-case basis
when to punish a person for contempt of court.
The area covered by the term "abuse of the court process" is potentially much
larger than contempt and this is borne out by the fact that our survey shows a total
of eleven cases in this category.323 Of the eleven cases, eight involve what the court
describes as frivolous or vexatious claims, that is, claims which have no merit and
merely take up court time and cause delay.324 However, abuse of court process can and
has involved other situations that do not fit within the vexatious or frivolous group.
For example, an attempt to get the same case heard twice, as in Fenerty v. The City
of Halifax32 5 or an attempt to introduce a questionable confession by a youth, as in R.
v. Marsman326 or a delay in carrying forth an action as in Martell v. Robert McAlpine
Ltd.,"' were all considered to involve an abuse of the court process. Since the abuse
of process category involves 11.3% of the total number of cases, it does constitute and
provide the court with a much broader scope for the exercise of inherent jurisdiction
that does the contempt power. As we have already seen, the jurisdictional justification
referred to as "control of the court's process" provides an even wider amount of
operation.
III. The expansion and use of inherentjurisdiction to areas other than contempt and
abuse of court process
The Court of Appeal also noted that the operation of inherent jurisdiction evolved
from a rather limited historical base (even taking into account the larger area of
abusive process) into a much broader based jurisdiction.3 28 This is also confirmed by
the survey which shows the trial courts of Nova Scotia taking a number of actions, not
involving contempt or abuse of court.329
As these examples demonstrate, Nova Scotia courts have not considered
themselves restrained in the exercise of their inherent jurisdiction to the confines of
322. Nova Scotia, Civil Procedure Rules, Rule 89.
323. Holme, supra note 87; MacDonald (No 2), supra note 306; Carson, supra note 91; Fenerty,
supra note 91; Hirtle, supra note 306; Martell, supra Appendix "B"; Corkum, supra Appendix "B";
Marineserve.MG, supra note 306; Marsman, supra Appendix "B"; Lutz, supra note 243; and Pottier,
supra note 91.
324. These include: Holme, ibid; MacDonald (No 2), ibid; Carson, ibid; Fenerty, ibid; Hirtle, ibid,
Marineserve.MG, ibid; Lutz, ibid; and Pottier, ibid.
325. Supra note 91.
326. Ibid.
327. Ibid.
328. Ocean, supra note 43 at para 73, quoting WH Charles, supra note 72.
329. The expansion of inherent jurisdiction beyond contempt (and a base of processes referred to in
Appendix "A") includes as follows: (1) altering the terms of a trust (Re Spencer, supra Appendix "C");
(2) exercising power to deal with child custody matters (Re Margaret Murphy, supra Appendix "C");
(3) exercising power to authorize a trustee to sell trust property (Re Nathanson Estate, supra Appendix
"C"); (4) exercising jurisdiction over infants brought before the court (O'Neill, supra Appendix "C");
(5) to prevent an injustice (Sharma, supra note.91); (6) power to review child support (Warner, supra
Appendix "C"); (7) to alter the administration of a charitable trust (Re Killam Estate, supra Appendix
"C"); (8) to fashion a remedy such as declaratory relief (Re Gerrard (2000), 188 NSR (2d) 224); (9)
power to interfere in a proposal to creditors (Re Laserworks Computer Services, supra Appendix "C");
(10) to fill a gap in a statute (NMM, supra Appendix "C"); and (11) the power to order division of
property (Viadi v Viadi (1986), 73 NSR (2d) 418).
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situations involving "contempt of court" or "abuse of the court process." Thus, they
confirm the observation of Justice Bateman in Ocean in this regard.
IV. Inherent jurisdiction is primarily procedural
This characteristic of inherent jurisdiction is clearly borne in the survey results which
show that 50 per cent of the cases involving the exercise of inherent jurisdiction have
been characterized by the court as involving a procedural aspect or a procedural matter.
As already mentioned, this constitutes a major limitation on the operation of inherent
jurisdiction and shows that Nova Scotia courts have adhered to such a limitation. This
particular characteristic of inherent jurisdiction is based upon the need for the court to
control its own process, a necessity that Justice Saunders considers vital to the court
being able to carry out its constitutional function as a court. Nova Scotia courts have
therefore recognized and accepted the procedural elements of inherent jurisdiction
both in terms of its importance to the court and the fact that it operates as a general
limitation upon the scope of inherent jurisdiction..
V. Limits of the court jurisdiction
As previously noted, Justice Bateman observed in Ocean that "in this jurisdiction the
courts have generally addressed what is not a proper exercise of the court's inherent
jurisdiction on a case by case basis."330 The case survey confirms this observation.
Apart from the general suggestion that inherent jurisdiction be exercised primarily
with regard to procedural matters, the more definitive limitation imposed by statutes
and the rather ambiguous situation vis-A-vis the rules of court, Nova Scotia courts
have not attempted a more general and theoretical explanation of the limits of inherent
jurisdiction. In view of the fact that there may be more than one area covered by
inherent jurisdiction this result is not surprising.
None of the theories put forward to explain the basis for inherent jurisdiction
attempt to explain or define its limits33' even thought Jacob asserted that this is a
question that deserves to be answered.332
In a case decided prior to Ocean, Justice Hallett of the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal recognized the lack of clearly defined limits. However, he went on to suggest
that in some cases, (which he did not mention) certain limits had been established.
His decision in Golden Forest Holdings"' that a court could not exercise its inherent
jurisdiction to vary a consent order, appears to be an example of the case-by-case
approach described by Justice Bateman in the Ocean case.
In yet another decision of the Court of Appeal (non-trilogy) the only limit referred
to by the court was the need to apply a common law rule or rule of court regarding
fairness before using the court's discretion to exercise its inherent jurisdiction.334
Our survey of cases demonstrated that there are some general limits imposed by
statutes and rules as well as a general restriction that inherent jurisdiction be limited to
procedural matters. Statutes and rules accounted for 20.4%111 of such cases while the
more general restriction to procedural matters was applicable in 56% of the cases. 36
330. Supra note 43 at para 74.
331. Charles, supra note 72.
332. Supra note 2.
333. Supra note 46.
334. ABNAmro Bank, supra note 77.
335. For a list of these cases see supra notes 91 and 92.
336. Supra note 91.
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In addition to these general limitations there were more specific limits imposed by the
trial courts of Nova Scotia. These are listed, discussed and compared with the Dockray
list in Part IV of this paper entitled "Limits of Inherent Jurisdiction." As can be seen
when that data is reviewed, there are at least seven specific limits that the Nova Scotia
courts have imposed on the exercise of inherent jurisdiction."'
VI. Just and equitable basis for inherent jurisdiction
The Jacob article has also been used by Nova Scotia courts to support the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction on the basis that it is just and equitable to do so. In Ocean the
Court of Appeal cautions "inherent jurisdiction does not bestow an unfettered right to
do what in the judge's opinion, is fair as between the parties."" This appears to be a
reference to the court's earlier decision in Goodwin where the Court, paraphrasing the
words of Jacob, suggest that inherent jurisdiction "is a power which a superior trial
court enjoys to be used where it is just and equitable to do so.""' Such an approach
according to the latest decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal "must be employed
within a framework of principles relevant to the matter in issue."340 This suggestion
clearly indicates concern that inherent jurisdiction exercised on the basis on what is
just and equitable in the circumstances could result in the arbitrary exercise of that
discretion.
If we look at the survey results to see how many times the trial courts of Nova
Scotia have actually resorted to the just and equitable basis for exercising inherent
jurisdiction we find that they did so in only three cases when the Jacob rationale was
specifically referred to and applied.34' There were six other cases where the court did
make reference to just and equitable when arriving at its decision but did so without
any reference to the Jacob article.34 2 We can only speculate as to whether the court was
aware of the article (at least in the four cases decided after 1970) or whether the trial
courts were merely exercising their historical chancery or equity court powers.
There were a total of eight cases where the courts specifically made reference
to the Jacob rationale of just and equitable.343 Five of these were Court of Appeal
decisions and of these the rationale was only applied in one (Goodwin).3  Therefore,
the actual number of trial court decisions in which the Jacob rationale was referred
to and applied was three or three per cent of the total of 97: not a significant number.
If we count both trial and Court of Appeal decisions we have eight out of 97 cases
amounting to 8.2 per cent of the total cases where justice and equity as a basis for
inherent jurisdiction exercise was considered. In terms of the actual application of
inherent jurisdiction the trial court seemed more likely to apply justice and equity
337. See Part IV.
338. Supra note 43 at 225.
339. Supra note 43 at para 17.
340. Ocean, supra note 43.
341. Bowles, supra note 316; Embil, supra note 92; and C1BC, supra note 243.
342. These include: Auchterlony, supra note 89; Verge, supra note 91; Sharma, supra note 91;
Metropolitan Authority, supra note 268; Re Gerrard, supra note 326; and Laserworks, supra Appendix
"C".
343. Ocean, supra note 43; Ofume, supra note 43; ABN Amro Bank, supra note 77; Golden Forest
Holdings, supra note 46; Goodwin, supra note 43; Bowles, supra note 316; Embil, supra note 92; and
CIBC, supra note 243.
344. Supra note 43.
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than the Court ofAppeal. This is not surprising in light of the caution expressed by the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Ocean.
VII. The exercise ofjudicial discretion generally
It is also interesting to note that prior to the decision in Ocean3 45 there had been courts
concerned with the exercise ofjudicial discretion when invoking inherent jurisdiction.
In ABNAmro3 46 the Court of Appeal had insisted that the trial court should consider
and apply the test of fairness developed by the common law and the rules of court
before making a decision based on inherent jurisdiction. Similarly, in Ofume, Justice
Saunders emphasized the need for the court to give full consideration to a number of
factors before exercising discretion to allow lay persons to represent others before
the courts of Nova Scotia. He made no reference to what is just and equitable in this
situation or between the parties but he did state that it was in the interest of justice
generally to allow judges to decide who may appear before them on a case by case
basis. In Ocean,34 7 Justice Bateman made no reference to justice in her decision, but
did emphasize the need for the court to explain the reasons for the court invoking its
inherent jurisdiction.
345. Supra note 43.
346. Supra note 77.
347. Supra note 43.
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Appendix B
Survey results: procedural cases
1. Shatford v LeBlanc (1888), 20 NSR 373. Court amends pleadings in order to
rectify mistake.
2. Re Murray Estate (1889), 22 NSR 125 (SC). Court corrects its own decision.
3. Paint v Gillies (1891), 26 NSR 526. Court rescinds the order of a single judge
fixing the date of a trial of an election petition.
4. Auchterloney v Palgrave Gold Mining Co (1897), 29 NSR 41. Court stays the
execution of judgments and postpones foreclosure sales.
5. Holmes v Taylor (1899), 32 NSR 791 (CA). Court strikes out frivolous pleas.
6. The King v MacDonald (No 2) (1901), 5 CCC 279 (NSSC). Court awards costs
regarding an unfounded claim.
7. Carson v Montreal Trust Co (1915), 23 DLR 690 (NSSC). Court deems action
vexatious or frivolous.
8. Fenerty v The City of Halifax (1920), 53 NSR 457 (SC). Court dismisses an
action already heard on the basis of res judicata-deemed to be an abuse of
process.
9. The King v Verge (1924-25), 57 NSR 235. Court exercises court power to fix
or adjourn a hearing "as the court thinks fit, in the interest of justice."
10. Hirtle v Hirtle (1949), 24 MDR 447 (NSSC). Court acknowledges its power to
strike out all or part of a pleading that is scandalous, vexatious and an abuse of
the court's process.
11. Lockwood v Brentwood Park Investments Ltd (1970), 1 NSR (2d) 669 (SC).
Court consolidates several actions.
12. R v Marsman (1976), 22 NSR (2d) 491 (SC). Court dismisses a criminal action
as an abuse of the court's process because of a questionable confession by a
youth.
13. Lutz v Pyke (1977), 36 NSR (2d) 420 (Co Ct). County Court has the power to
strike out a frivolous and vexatious claim per Rule 14.25.
14. Martell v Robert McAlpine Ltd( 1978), 25 NSR (2d) 540 (SC). Action dismissed
for unreasonable delay.
15. Hammerling v AG For Nova Scotia (1978), 32 NSR (2d) 366. Court has
the power to rehear or reconsider matters before the court and to modify or
withdraw decision-prior to final judgment.
16. Widrig v Widrig (1981), 48 NSR (2d) 269 (SC (TD)). Court can supervise its
own process and interpret the decision of the divorce judge.
17. Pothier et al v AG ofNS et al (1984), 63 NSR (2d) 151 (SC). Court can strike
out a statement of claim because it does not demonstrate a reasonable cause of
action. Action taken to present an abuse of the court process.
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18. Re Keddy Motor Inns Ltd (1991), 107 NSR (2d) 419 (SC). Court can amend or
vary an order made under the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act pursuant
to its inherent jurisdiction to control its own process.
19. NsC Corp v ABNAmro Bank Canada (1992), 116 NSR (2d) 97 (SC). Court
has inherent jurisdiction over counsel.
20. Snair v Halifax Insurance Nationale-Nederlanden North America Corp
(1994), 139 NSR (2d) 161 (SC). Power to control the court's own process not
affected by contractual provisions that try to nullify its inherent jurisdiction.
21. R v Curragh Inc (1995), 146 NSR (2d) 163 (SC). Court has power to award
costs in a criminal case against the Crown in order to preserve the integrity of
the criminal justice system.
22. R v Corkum (1997), 163 NSR (2d) 197 (SC). Court can make an order for
costs and control its own process when the Crown fails to disclose certain
documents.
23. R v Pottier, [1999] NSJ no 95 (NSCA). A superior court has jurisdiction to
award costs in a criminal matter.
24. 353903 Ontario Ltd v Black & MacDonald Ltd (1999), 180 NSR (2d) 194
(SC). Court has inherent jurisdiction to present an abuse of process regarding
a frivolous or vexatious action.
25. Goodwin v Rodgerson, 2002 NSCA 137. Court can set aside an order of the
Prothonotary in order to avoid an unjust result as part of the court's power to
control its own process.
26. Van de Wiel v National Life Assurance Co of Canada, 2002 NSSC 209. Court
can set aside or vary an order of the Prothonotary that is procedural in nature.
27. Canada AG v Marinserve.MG Inc, 2003 NSSC 26. Court can dismiss an
application on the ground that it is frivolous or vexatious, or an abuse of
process.
28. R v R (MC), 2004 NSSC 10. Court has power to ban the publication of certain
information before the Court as part of its inherent jurisdiction to control its
own process.
29. Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Ofume, 2003 NSCA 110, 218 NSR (2d)
234. Court permits a husband to represent his wife in legal proceedings as part
of the court's inherent jurisdiction to control its own process.
30. Oakland/Indian Point Residents Assn v Seaview Properties Ltd, 2008 NSSC
209, 266 NSR (2d) 256. Court can review affidavit evidence where an
application is made, on the basis that the claim discloses no reasonable cause
of action.
In Ocean, supra note 43, the Nova Scotia Court ofAppeal suggested that in exceptional
circumstances the court could order a litigant to undergo mental assessment to
determine the litigant's competency to carry forward the litigation.
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Appendix C
Inherent jurisdiction cases based on Chancery jurisdiction
For ease of reference the cases have been identified to show which aspect of Chancery
jurisdiction was being invoked under the label of inherent jurisdiction. "PP" designates
an exercise of the parens patriae powers. "E" indicates the exercise of some specific
equitable power and "R" indicates a remedy permitted by the court.
E 1. Shatford v LeBlanc (1888), 20 NSR 373.
E 2. Re Estate of William P Spencer (1969), 1 NSR (2d) 282 (SC)
[Re Spencer].
PP 3. Re Murphy, Margaret (1970), 3 NSR (2d) 293 (SC (TD)).
E 4. Re Nathanson Estate (1971), 4 NSR (2d) 113 (SC).
PP 5. O'Neill v O'Neill (1971), 4 NSR (2d) 640 (SC).
PP 6. Dernell v Children ' Aid Society of Cape Breton (1978), 26 NSR (2d)
125 (SC (AD)).
PP 7. Mintz v Mintz (1979), 33 NSR (2d) 585 (SC (TD)).
PP 8. Warner v Warner (1996), 150 NSR (2d) 38 (SC).
R 9. Re Laserworks Computer Services Inc (1998), 165 NSR (2d) 296
(CA).
E 10. Re Killam Estate (1999), 185 NSR (2d) 201 (SC).
R 11. Gerrard (Bankrupt), Re (2000), 188 NSR (2d) 224 (SC).
PP 12. Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v R Petel (2007), 253
NSR (2d) 177 (SC).
PP 13. Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v NNM and RDM
(2008), 262 NSR (2d) 384 (SC).
PP 14. Quigley v Willmore, 2008 NSSC 353, 272 NSR (2d) 61.
PP 15.* Pottinger v Hann (2003), 215 NSR (2d) 176 (SC).
PP 16. EAH v TDG (1995), 143 NSR (2d) 232 (CA).
